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INTRODUCTION
When southern slave owners sought to limit the power of African-
Americans, they enacted slave laws that either prohibited African-
Americans from becoming ministers' or severely limited their free-
dom to preach.2 Southerners feared the power of the pulpit almost as
much as they feared the power of firearms.3 If slaves could read and
interpret scriptures, they could find egalitarian references that might
1 See, e.g., Act of 1832, ch. IV, 1832 N.C. Sess. Laws 7.
2 See, e.g., Act of 1847, § 2, 1847 Mo. Laws 103, 104 (providing that "no meeting or
assemblage of negroes... for the purpose of religious worship, or preaching, shall be held
or permitted when the services are performed or conducted by negroes ... unless some
sheriff, constable, marshall, police officer, orjustice of the peace, shall be present"); Act of
1823, ch. XI, 1823 Miss. Laws 61, 62-63 (providing that slaves could attend religious serv-
ices with permission from their master only if (a) the services were conducted by a white
minister, or (b) services conducted by a black minister were attended by at least two
whites).
S Accordingly, one state statute combined the prohibition of firearms and sanction
against preaching:
Other provisions of the statute prohibit any negro or mulatto from having
fire-arms; and one provision of the statute declares that for "exercising the
functions of a minister of the Gospel free negroes and mulattoes, on convic-
tion, may be punished by any number of lashes not exceeding thirty-nine
on the bare back, and shall pay the costs."
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Senator Trumbull).
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make them rebellious. 4 Accordingly, "negroes and mulattoes" who
performed the functions of ministers were subject to public whip-
ping.5 Even gathering for worship to hear others preach was consid-
ered dangerous. As early as 1734, the South Carolina Assembly
enacted a statute which regulated slaves from leaving their plantations
on "Sundays, fast days, and holy days."6 Although slaves were finally
permitted to attend religious services, the statutes typically required a
white minister, or other white representatives, to conduct the meet-
ings.7 Even the white preachers were not entirely free to preach to
slaves. They were closely supervised by representatives from the plan-
tations.8 Southern fear of African-American preachers was quite justi-
fied. Nat Turner and Denmark Vesey, two slave revolt leaders, were
4 The organization of some of the slave codes suggests this connection between read-
ing and religion. For example, statutes that prohibited blacks from gathering to learn to
read also prohibited blacks from attending religious services unless the minister was white
or at least one white was in attendance. These provisions followed one another in the
statutes. See, e.g., ch. XI, 1823 Miss. Laws at 62-68; §§ 1-2, 1847 Mo. Laws at 103-04.
See also MARGARET WASHINGTON CREEL, "A PECULIAR PEOPLE": SLAVE RELIGION AND
COMMUNITY-CULTURE AMONG THE Gu.JAHs 74 (1988) (arguing that many slave holders
opposed religious training for slaves in part because they feared an egalitarian interpreta-
tion of the scriptures); ALBERTJ. RABOTEAU, SLAVE RELIGION: THE "INVISIBLE INSTITUTION"
IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 102 (1978) ("The danger beneath the arguments for slave con-
version which many masters feared was the egalitarianism implicit in Christianity."). One
such egalitarian passage is: "There is no such thing as Jew and Greek, slave and freeman,
male and female; for you are all one person in Christ Jesus." Galatians 3:28. Of course,
such provisions were interpreted quite differently by different groups. Slave holders man-
aged to turn scriptures to their advantage arguing that equality in heaven was cause for
patience with inequality on earth. See CREEL, supra. For a brief discussion of the implica-
tions of Christian theology, see Sanford A. Lakoff, Christianity and Equality, in EQUA.IT1.
NoMos IX 115 (J. Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 1967).
5 See, e.g., ch. IV, 1882 N.C. Sess. Laws, at 7 (providing for a penalty of thirty-nine
lashes for blacks who preached).
6 CREEL, supra note 4, at 75.
7 Act of December 1831, ch. 94, 1845 Md. Laws (outlawing all religious meetings for
blacks except those conducted by whites); Act of 1847, § 2, 1847 Mo. Laws at 104 (prohibit-
ing blacks from preaching unless a sheriff or other police officer was present to "prevent all
seditious speeches"); Act of 1805, ch. XII, 1805 Va. Acts (prohibiting slaves from attending
religious ceremonies unless they were conducted by whites).
Nevertheless, slaves managed to create some of their own churches even before
emancipation:
[I] t is clear that the slave community had an extensive religious life of its
own, hidden from the eyes of the master. In the secrecy of the quarters or
the seclusion of the brush arbors ("hush harbors") the slaves made Christi-
anity truly their own.... Preachers licensed by the church and hired by the
master were supplemented by slave preachers licensed only by the spirit.
RABOTEAU, supra note 4, at 212. The nature of this slave religion varied from place to place
and was ambivalent about the role of slavery. Sometimes religion was used as a consolation
for the difficulties of slave life, promising a reward in the hereafter. Other times religion
was used to inspire rebellion. For a discussion of this ambivalence, see Vincent Harding,
Religion and Resistance Among Antebellum Negroes, 1800-1860, in RELIGION IN AMERICAN HIS-
TORY 270 (John M. Mulder &John F. Wilson eds., 1978).
8 RABoTEAu, supra note 4, at 214 (documenting that overseers supervised religious
services for slaves to ensure that the sermons urged slaves to be obedient and docile).
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both preachers who used their ministry to challenge white authority
and slavery.9 The slave owners recognized that one effective way to
subjugate slaves was to prevent them from having access to pulpits.
Similarly, in early colonial times, female preachers were perse-
cuted. For example, Anne Hutchinson was banished from the Massa-
chusetts Bay Colony for advocating the belief that God conferred
grace directly on individuals regardless of their sex or social class, a
philosophy known as antinomianism.' 0 At her trial, the governor in-
formed her that she had "maintained a meeting and an assembly in
[her] house that hath been condemned by the general assembly as a
thing not tolerable nor comely in the sight of God nor fitting for your
sex.""' For colonial women, the penalty for preaching was expulsion
or even death. 12
Anne Hutchinson viewed herself as a faithful member of the
church. Her views were part of a larger movement that placed more
emphasis on "grace" than "works," but she did not consider herself a
heretic. Nor did the scores of Bostonians who flocked to her house to
hear her interpret scriptures. Indeed, her very success in attracting
followers doomed her.13
9 Denmark Vesey used biblical references to incite the rebellion. As one slave testi-
fied at the trial following the conspiracy, "At this meeting Vesey said... that we ought to
rise up and fight against the whites for our liberties .... [H]e read to us from the Bible, how
the Children of Israel were delivered out of Egypt from bondage." Rolla's Statement, in 1 A DOCUMEN.
TARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 76 (Herbert Aptheker ed.,
1990). For a description of Denmark Vesey's conspiracy see CREEL, supra note 4, at 22-23.
For a description of Nat Turner's rebellion, see generally STEPHEN B. OATES, THE FIRES OF
JUBILEE: NAT TURNER'S FIERCE REBELLION (1975).
10 See Rosemary S. Keller, New England Women: Ideology and Experience in First Generation
Puritanism (1630-1650), in 2 WOMEN AND RELIGION IN AMERICA 132, 139-40 (Rosemary R.
Ruether & Rosemary S. Keller eds., 1993) [hereinafter WOMEN AND RELIGION]; see also
Ashby D. Boyle II, Fear and Trembling at the Court: Dimensions of Understanding in the Supreme
Court's ReligionJurisprudence 3 SETON HALL CONsT. I.J. 55, 86 (1993); Marci A. Hamilton,
The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Jurisprudence: A Theological
Account of the Failure to Protect Religious Conduct, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 779-80 n.385 (1993);
David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Relkious Liberty, 76 CORNELL I
REv. 769, 862 n. 343 (1991).
11 Examination of Mrs. Anne Hutchinson at the Court of Newtown, in ROOT OF BrrrERNESS:
DOCUMENTS OF THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERIcAN WOMEN 34, 34 (Nancy F. Cott ed., 1972)
[hereinafter Examination of Mrs. Anne Hutchinson].
12 Similarly Mary Dyer, who became a Quaker, was executed for her proselytizing.
DAVID D. HALL, WORLDS OF WONDER, DAYS OF JUDGMENT: POPULAR RELIGIOUS BELIEF IN
EARLY NEw ENGLAND 101 (1989).
13 See GARRY WILLS, UNDER GOD: RELIGION AND AmERIcAN PoLrIcs 344-45 (1990) (ar-
guing that the growth in number of Hutchinson's influential followers prompted John
Winthrop to take drastic steps to prevent the spread of Hutchinsonian beliefs, and that
Winthrop's efforts ultimately led to Hutchinson's banishment).
The dispute amounted to a controversy over what it meant to be a member of the
community politically, religiously, and socially. Politically, Anne Hutchinson was danger-
ous to the government because she had attracted such a wide following in Boston that she
posed a threat to the existing balance between church and state. Id. at 344. Indeed, Gov-
ernorJohn Winthrop may have feared the possibility of a challenge to his political power,
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Anne Hutchinson represented a triple threat to the ruling group:
she threatened them politically, religiously, and culturally. She posed
the risk of shifting political power to women and members of the
working classes while also altering the role of the sexes. When Gover-
nor John Winthrop exiled Hutchinson, he denied her followers the
right to practice their faith. Consequently, one group's free exercise
of religion limited the free exercise of a subgroup.
However, as the governor made clear at Anne Hutchinson's trial,
more was at stake than her religious views. 14 She had sinned not only
because she disagreed, but also because she had engaged in behavior
"not... fitting for [her] sex."' 5 Hence, she was the victim of both
religious persecution and gender discrimination. 16 The two forms of
discrimination were intertwined because Hutchinson's gender may
have rendered her more likely to believe that sex was not the crucial
measure of God's grace. Consequently, her religious views may have
seemed more radical because they were espoused by a woman.
which derived in part from ties to the Church of England. Id. at 343. Some historians
believe that her views of divine grace threatened the unity of church and state. Id. at 344.
Others believe that her antinomianist views were too threatening to the Church of Eng-
land. Id. Although the Massachusetts Bay Colony was Congregationalist in practice, its
charter came from the King of England who had appointed the Archbishop of Canterbury
to be the lord commissioner of plantations. I&d at 342-43. Alienating the Archbishop could
have endangered the colony's charter. Id. at 342-45. Thus the political threat converged
with the religious threat.
14 Garry Wills argues that the struggle also centered on the political balance of power.
According to Wills, the governor wanted to a~.oid offending Archbishop Laud, who was
both the archbishop of Canterbury (the highest religious authority in the Church of Eng-
land) and the king's lord commissioner of plantations. Accordingly, the governor sought
to minimize the differences between the predominant Congregationalist churches in the
Massachusetts Bay Colony and the Church of England. According to this theory, antinomi-
anists were a problem not because they were Congregationalist heretics, but because they
threatened the delicate balance between the Church of England, the colony, and the Con-
gregationalist community. Id.
15 Examination of Mrs. Anne Hutchinson, supra note 11, at 34. Although not used at the
trial, Governor Winthrop accused Anne Hutchinson and two of her followers of being
witches. Specifically, he alleged that Anne Hutchinson and Jane Hawkins had assisted at
the birth of a stillborn child delivered to Mary Dyer. The stillborn child was evidence that
all three were witches. Keller, supra note 10, at 140. Indeed, powerful women were often
condemned as witches. Consequently, most of the witches executed were midwives or
other women with healing powers who threatened the power of clerics or the church. See
ANN L. BARSTOW, WITCHCRAZE: A NEW HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN WITCH HUNTS 19, 109-27
(1994); MARY DALY, BEYOND GOD THE FATHER: TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF WOMEN'S LIBERA-
TION 64 (1973); ANDREA DWORIuN, WOMAN HATING 139-40 (1974).
16 Rosemary Ruether argues that Puritan women, who had been persecuted dissidents
in England and who faced great burdens in the colonies, were unusually strong and in-
dependent. These qualities clashed with the Puritan doctrine that strictly limited women's
roles. Ruether sees the trial of Anne Hutchinson, as well as the witch hunts, as methods "to
cow or to eliminate these 'improper' women and to reinforce the normative standard of
women's behavior and place in Puritan society." ROSEMARY R. RUETHER, SEXISM AND GOD-
TALK TOWARD A FEMINIST THEOLOGY 171 (1983).
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In much the same way, racial discrimination and religious exclu-
sion were mutually reinforcing for the slave states. Just as a woman
might be more attracted to a faith that believed that grace was con-
ferred on all genders, African-Americans might be more likely to read
the Bible to condemn rather than support slavery. Therefore, the
prohibitions against African-American preachers were meant both to
circumvent certain religious views and to reinforce the subordination
of African-Americans.
Prohibiting African-Americans or women from becoming reli-
gious leaders contributed to their subordinated status. Moraljustifica-
tions for slavery or patriarchy partly depend on assumptions of
biological, social, and educational inferiority. Placing African-Ameri-
cans or women in prominent leadership roles challenged those as-
sumptions. Preachers were supposed to be smart, literate, articulate,
and honest; slaves were not supposed to be smart enough to learn to
read, let alone preach. Lest there be any risk, however, the same stat-
utes that prohibited African-American ministers also prohibited teach-
ing African-Americans to read.17 Similarly, women were supposed to
be emotional rather than rational, and therefore less able to preach.' 8
A powerful sermon delivered by an African-American or a woman was
thus a threat to the very social fabric of domination.
As the history of slave preachers and colonial women ministers
suggests, issues of religious freedom often include biases such as race
or gender discrimination. Hence, much of the constitutional jurispru-
dence about the religion clauses can be criticized as essentialist.19
That is, it fails to account for the fact that religious individuals have
several identities based on a variety of factors including race, gender,
age, disability, and national origin.20 Anne Hutchinson, for example,
17 Ch. XI, 1823 Miss. Laws at 62-63; §§ 1-2, 1847 Mo. Laws at 103-04.
18 "A woman's preaching is like a dog's walking on his hind legs. It is not done well,
but you are surprised to find it done at all." JAMES BoSwELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUELJOHNSON
L.L.D. 132 (1952) (quoting Samuel Johnson).
19 See generally ELUZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF ExcLusIoN IN
FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988) (arguing against white, middle-class bias in feminist theory);
Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991
DuKE LJ. 365 (discussing the intersection of race and gender discrimination in the context
of a court decision allowing an employer's prohibition of braided hairstyles); Kimberle
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidis-
crimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139
(criticizing "the tendency to treat race and gender as mutual'y exclusive categories of expe-
rience and analysis"); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REv. 581, 585 (1990) (arguing that gender essentialism silences "the same voices
that are silenced by the mainstream legal voice. . .- among them, the voices of black
women"); and Man Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness asJurispruden-
tial Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 7 (1989) (arguing for an acknowledgement in juris-
prudence of the experience of life under patriarchy and social hierarchy).
20 See Harris, supra note 19, at 585.
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was both a woman and an antinomianist. 2' A strict First Amendment
analysis of her case would focus on the role of the government vis-4-vis
the church. The role of sex discrimination would be subsumed within
that discussion. However, Anne Hutchinson was treated differently
from her male collaborator, John Cotton, who was able to remain a
member of the community by simply minimizing his religious views.22
Anne Hutchinson, in contrast, could not disavow her gender, so she
could not escape the claim that she had behaved inappropriately for
her sex. First Amendment analysis can also subsume racial discrimina-
tion. For example, the slave codes provided for African-American
preachers to be whipped, but these statutes did not provide the same
penalty for white abolitionist preachers who posed a similar threat.
Although the legal literature often reflects the competing demands
the polity and the church may make,23 it rarely discusses the compli-
cating factors of race and gender.24
We no longer live in the quasi-theocracy of Anne Hutchinson's
time,2 so we would like to think that the separation of church and
state insulates us from confronting religious institutions that discrimi-
nate. Although we no longer whip African-American preachers nor
21 Antinomianists believe that faith alone is necessary for salvation. WILLs, supra note
13, at 156.
22 John Cotton, Anne Hutchinson's mentor and religious leader, was not exiled or
even tried because he disclaimed his antinomianist views. WOMEN AND RELIGION, supra
note 10, at 167 (excerpt from Hutchinson's trial in which the court ruled that "Mr. Cotton
and Mr. Vane were of her judgment, but Mr. Cotton hath cleared himself that he was not
of that mind.").
23 See generally MARTHA MiNow, MAKING AL. THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,
AND AMERICAN LAW 43-47 (1990) (discussing the "dilemma of difference," i.e., the problem
of overcoming past discrimination based on group differences, without relying on those
differences); MARY, TusHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTrU-
TIONAL LAw (1988) (examining commentary on judicial review over the past generation);
Nomi M. Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the
Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HAv. L. REv. 581 (1993) (describing the conflict be-
tween some Fundamentalist Christians and public schools over the definition of educa-
tion); Carol Weisbrod, Emblems of Federalism, 25 U. MICH. J.L Rr. 795 (1992) (contrasting
non-state federalism with conventional political federalism).
24 Only a few articles have attacked this problem. See, e.g., Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimina-
tion in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation ofDiscrimination by Religious Organizations, 79
COLUM. L. REv. 1514 (1979) (arguing that the more closely related the employment issue is
to the core of faith the more protection there should be for the religious institution);
Joanne C. Brant, "Our Shield Belongs to the Lord": Religious Employers and a Constitutional Right
to Discriminate 21 HASTINGS CONSr. L.Q. 275 (1994); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General
Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of the Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church
Autonomy, 81 COLuM. L. RPv. 1373 (1981) (arguing that churches have a constitutionally
protected interest in managing their own institutions free of government interference); Ira
C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimina-
tion, 67 B.U. L. REv. 391 (1987) (arguing that religious institutions should use membership
criteria as the criteria for employment).
25 Although the Massachusetts Bay Colony was dominated by the Congregationalist
churches formed by the Puritans, the Church of England was the formally established reli-
gion there. WILs, supra note 13, at 343.
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exile women who dare to interpret scriptures, we do lend the power of
the state to exclude women and minorities from religious offices.
For a recent example, consider the case of Darreyl M. Young, an
African-American woman minister in the United Methodist church
who claimed she was fired because of her gender and race.2 6 Rever-
end Young was a probationary pastor for four years, and received a
perfect score on her evaluation by the church she served. One of her
references in the evaluation process described Reverend Young as
follows:
Rev. Young is clearly and evidently called into the ministry as evi-
denced by her service to the community, her commitment to feed-
ing and clothing the poor, and her commitment to preaching the
word of God. Rev. Young exemplifies much professionalism and
academic training in leadership ability, directing small groups, ad-
ministrative skills and counseling.... Her preaching is enlighten-
ing, informative as well as uplifting and encouraging to the African-
American community. Rev. Young is very knowledgeable about the
Bible and relating it to the Christian tradition of the African-Ameri-
can community.2 7
When the conference replaced her, the Pastor Parish Relations Com-
mittee protested saying in part:
We have had white men, black men, and African men as pastors.
She is the best pastor of all of them and we are not interested in
changing. She has done more for our church than all of the other
pastors put together. Our church membership has grown from 35
to 149 in the time she has been our pastor. We have five choirs. We
have programs that attract the children and youth to our church.
Our food pantry feeds over 500 families a month, as well as give
[sic] them clothing. We have a GED program, and a drug and alco-
hol abuse counseling program. When Rev. Young came, we were 22
months behind in our mortgage. Now we are $5,900 behind and we
plan to pay off our mortgage this summer.28
Despite these excellent evaluations, the Board of Ordained Ministry
and the Bishop fired Reverend Young.2 9
If Young had worked for any other employer, the government
would have assured her an opportunity to present her case of sex and
race discrimination to a federal court. However, the district court dis-
26 Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 818 F. Supp. 1206
(N.D. Ill. 1993), aff'd, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. C. 320 (1994).
27 Rev. Virgil Jones' reference for evaluation of Rev. Young, on file with the author.
28 Letter from the Pastor Parish Relations Committee to Rev. Myron McCoy, District
Superintendent (May 3, 1992) (on file with the author).
29 Young, 21 F.3d at 184.
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missed the case on the basis of the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment before Young even had a chance to present the facts.30
Young's case did not seriously intrude on First Amendment
rights. Unlike some religions, United Methodist doctrine expressly
supports equality for women and African-Americans. 31 Hence, the
employer claimed no religious justification for any discrimination.
Nor was this a hiring case in which the religious organization could
complain that Reverend Young was not sufficiently educated or versed
in church doctrine to serve as a minister. Instead, the conference al-
ready had found Young to be well qualified, and had permitted her to
serve as the pastor of a church for four years. To defend against the
discrimination claim, the United Methodist Conference merely had to
articulate a non-discriminatory reason for firing Young. The Confer-
ence refused. The government condoned the discrimination by refus-
ing to provide Reverend Young the protection it offers virtually all
other employees.
Therefore, the government grants discriminatory religious orga-
nizations the power to perpetuate subordination. Statutes, regula-
tions, and cases that enable religious organizations to discriminate 32
30 Young, 818 F. Supp. at 1206.
31 THE BOOK or DiSCIPLrNE OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, 93-95 (1992) ("We
affirm all persons as equally valuable in the sight of God.... [W]e recognize racism as a
sin .... We affirm women and men to be equal in every aspect of their common life.").
32 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1994) (specifically exempting religious institutions from
Title VII anti-discrimination laws for bona fide occupational qualifications of the institu-
tion); see also The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb (1994) (stating
that the Congressional findings and purposes for the act were to restore the "compelling
interest test" set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972), and to provide a claim or defense for government interference in free
exercise of religion); id. § 2000bb-1 (which protects free exercise of religion by stating that
"Government shall not substantially burden" free exercise unless there is "a compelling
government interest" and it is "the least restrictive means" available, and by creating a
judicial remedy for violation of the act); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (holding that
exempting a garment factory and gym owned and operated by the Mormon church, which
fired five employees for not meeting religious worthiness requirements, from Title VII re-
view under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 did not violate the establishment clause); N.L.RB. v. Catho-
lic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (holding that the Catholic High School
Association was not within N.L.R.B.jurisdicdon because there was a fear of excessive entan-
glement); Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct 320 (1994) (dismissing a sex and race discrimination
charge, which was brought by a black female against an all white male panel of elders,
because of fear of entanglement); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hospitals,
929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991) (dismissing age and sex discrimination charges against hospi-
tal due to a fear of entanglement); Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh Day Advent-
ists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986) (dismissing gender
and racial discrimination charges based on fear of excessive entanglement); DeMarco v.
Holy Cross High School, 797 F. Supp. 1142 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (granting a motion for sum-
mary judgment to a Catholic high school in age discrimination claim, which was brought
by a forty-nine year old man who was fired one year before tenure, on excessive entangle-
ment grounds); rev'd, 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993); Cochran v. St. Louis Preparatory Semi-
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operate to combine the power of church and state to limit the oppor-
tunities of the least powerful: the aged, the disabled, women, and
minorities.
Sometimes government rules explicitly adopt the discriminatory
practices of religious institutions. For example, women have been de-
nied federal jobs as chaplains because of the restrictions their
churches place on ordination.33 As a result, in 1987 only seventeen of
the 898 Veterans Administration chaplains employed by the federal
government were women.34 Other statutes exempt religious organiza-
tions from generally applicable anti-discrimination provisions.35 Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, for example, permits religious organiza-
tions to discriminate on the basis of religion. Some religions continue
to restrict leadership opportunities. 36 Consequently, some courts
have held that those religions that incorporate discriminatory princi-
ples in their faith can discriminate on the basis of race or sex. Even
when a religious organization advances no religious justification to
trigger the statutory exemption, courts often expressly permit reli-
gious institutions to discriminate on the basis of race, sex, age, or disa-
bility in their hiring and firing decisions for ministerial employees.37
Such discrimination operates as part of the general culture that keeps
certain groups subordinated in society.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
various statutes adopted to enforce it are the primary mechanisms for
attacking such state-sanctioned subordination. However, the Four-
nary, 717 F. Supp. 1413 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (dismissing an age discrimination claim because
examining at the seminary's intent would violate the establishment clause); Carter v. Balti-
more Annual Conference, No. CIVA 86-2543 SSH, 1987 WL 18470 (D.D.C. 1987) (grant-
ing a motion to dismiss a race discrimination charge brought by an ordained minister who
held an administrative position because the court feared that looking into the Church's
motives would violate free exercise); Feldstein v. Christian Science Monitor, 555 F. Supp.
974 (D. Mass. 1983) (allowing a newspaper owned by a religious organization to be exempt
from Title VII, thereby allowing the paper to discriminate on the basis of religion).
33 Murphy v. Derwinski, 990 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1993).
34 Id. at 542 n.4.
35 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1, 2000bb, 2000bb-1 (1994).
36 For example, some fundamentalists limit the role of blacks because they bear the
mark of Cain. Similarly, the Pope recently reiterated that women could never be Catholic
priests. Alan Cromwell, Pope Rules Out Debate on Making Women Priests, N.Y. TIMES, May 31,
1994, at 8. Women are also precluded from becoming ministers in a number of other
Christian faiths. MARGAEMT L. BENDROTH, FUNDAMENTALISM AND GENDER, 1875 TO THE
PRESENT (1998). OrthodoxJews also prohibit women rabbis. For a discussion of the patri-
archa nature of many religions see Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the
Bill of "Rights": A Bicentenial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 453, 459-86 (1992); WILLS, supra
note 13. Becker hints that religion is so patriarchal that it might be appropriate to amend
the Constitution to prohibit all forms of religious subsidy or require direct state regulation
of religion. Becker, supra, at 486.
37 See, e.g., Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d
184 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 320 (1994) (refusing to consider a black woman
minister's claim that the church discriminated by firing her).
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teenth Amendment seems to conflict with the provisions of the First
Amendment. Religious institutions use the First Amendment as a
shield to protect themselves against claims of illegal discrimination.
The argument is that any attempt to limit religions that discriminate
both interferes with their free exercise of religion and entangles the
government in religious decisions.
Part I of this Article argues that the primary constitutional value
should be to provide substantive equality.38 This Part argues that
equality is the most important constitutional value for three reasons:
First, historical analysis of the Declaration of Independence, the Four-
teenth Amendment, and the structure of our constitutional govern-
ment suggests that notions of equality are bound up with how we
define ourselves as a nation. Second, even if the primacy of equality is
not historically required, it legitimates applying the Constitution to
those who were excluded from the formation of the social contract at
the time of the founding.39 Third, placing equality at the pinnacle of
constitutional values is the only way to assure that other important
constitutional values remain protected. Both the free exercise of reli-
gion and free speech depend on individuals possessing an equal voice.
Part II of this Article describes the competing interests of employ-
ees, religious institutions, and the government. After demonstrating
the necessary state action in Part IIA, Part II.B explains the effects of
state authorized employment discrimination on employees' rights to
equal protection, free exercise of religion, and freedom to participate
and speak. Part II.C then considers the countervailing interests of
religious employers that might seem to justify discrimination, includ-
ing arguments that discrimination is private, justified by a right of free
association, or would foster governmentally controlled religion. Part
II.D concludes Part II with a discussion of the government's interests
in shielding religious institutions from non-religious illegal behavior,
accommodating sincere religious faith, avoiding entanglement with
religion, and combatting discrimination.
Part III concludes that conflicting constitutional principles
emerge that should be resolved by the primacy of equality. Part III.A
summarizes the constitutional relationship between religious freedom
38 Substantive equality requires individualized treatment to yield equal opportunity,
while formal equality calls for identical treatment, not allowing for existing differences.
For a fuller discussion of substantive equality, see, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAw 43-47 (1990); (1990); Christine A.
Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279 (1987); Catharine A. MacKin-
non, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.. 1281 (1991);Jane Rutherford, The
Myth ofDue Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 65-78 (1992); Robin West, The Meaning ofEquality and
the Interpretive Turn, 66 CHi-KENr L. REv. 451, 469. Kenneth Karst also sees equality as a
substantive concept and refers to it as "equal citizenship." KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING
TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1989).
39 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
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and equality. Part III.B of the Article suggests that remedies can be
crafted to dismantle discrimination while minimizing the impact on
religious liberties by providing a full range of remedies for non-relig-
iously based discrimination, but more limited remedies when the dis-
crimination is religiously based.
I
THE ROLE OF EQUALITY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME
A. The Historical Roots of Equality as a Unifying National Value
1. The Founding Period
Equality was central to our founding as a nation. As every school
child knows, the Declaration of Independence names the first self-
evident "Truth" to be "that all Men are created equal."40 This lan-
guage is more than mere surplusage or simple rhetoric. It was neces-
sary to make the revolution a legitimate political act rather than a
mere mutiny of disloyal subjects. Equality enabled the founders to
reject the divine right of kings to rule. Hence, the Declaration of In-
dependence claimed legitimacy by asserting a social contract among
equals as the source of the power to govern. That social contract rests
on the declaration "that all Men are created equal."41
If some men had greater claim to the right to govern, then the
king, who allegedly had been divinely invested with power, must be
obeyed. Independence would be not only mutinous, but sinful. In
order to attack the divine right of kings, philosophers had to establish
their own authority as equal to the monarch's. The solution was to
proclaim that all men were equal. Thus, when John Locke attacked
the divine right of kings, the philosopher claimed no greater right
than any other man.42 The right to govern must come from the peo-
ple themselves expressed through an implicit social contract.43
In rejecting the divine right of kings in favor of a secular social
contract, the Founders implicitly reordered the relationship between
church and state.4 Although many of the Founding Fathers
respected religion as the source of public virtue in their scheme of
republican government,45 they rejected religion as a source of legiti-
40 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
41 Id.
42 SeeJoHN LOCE, The First Treatise on Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
159 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960) (3d ed. 1698).
43 See generally JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise on Government, in THE TRAnsEs OF
GOVERNMENT 285 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960) (3d ed. 1698).
44 For a fuller discussion of the secular and nontraditionalist impact of the political
philosophy ofJohn Locke, see W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Alexander Dushku, Traditionalism,
Secularism, and the Transformative Dimension of Religious Institutions, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 421,
430-31.
45 See Lupu, supra note 24, at 418-19.
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mate state power. They preferred a social contract among equals to a
divine right. Therefore, the switch from theocracy to a secular state
rests in large part on the primacy of equality. As a result, equality at
least partially displaced religion as a source of authority to govern.
WhenJefferson wrote that "All Men are created equal," he meant
to include slaves and presumably their descendants. The first draft of
the Declaration of Independence included a diatribe against slavery
and blamed the King of England for this "execrable commerce" and
"assemblage of horrors. '46 Although that language disappeared from
the final draft, the more generalized claim to equality remained.
Equality is the demand outsiders make to participate more fully.4 7
Hence, when the colonists felt that the colonies were the mistreated
possessions of the British Empire, they asserted their independence
from England by claiming equal rights for all. Once the colonists had
succeeded in the Revolutionary War, however, they no longer viewed
themselves as outsiders. 48 Indeed, the Founding Fathers were affluent
"insiders."49 The original demand for equality was replaced by a gov-
46 The first draft of the Declaration of Independence, reprinted in VIRGINIA COMMIS-
SION ON CONsTrITuTIONAL G VERNMENT, THE AMERICAN BEGINNINGS 13 (1961), included
this passage:
He has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most
sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never
offended him, captivating and carrying them into slavery in another hemi-
sphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither. This
piratical warfare, the opprobrium of INFIDEL powers, is the warfare of the
CHIsTIAN KING of Great Britain. Determined to keep open a market where
MEN should be bought and sold, he has prostituted his negative for sup-
pressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain this execrable
commerce. And that this assemblage of horrors might want no fact of dis-
tinguished die, he is now exciting those very people to rise in arms among
us, and to purchase that liberty of which he has deprived them, by murder-
ing the people on whom he also obtruded them: thus paying off former
crimes committed against the LIBERTIES of one people with crimes which he
urges them to commit against the urvs of another.
47 See generally PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQuAfLTY 257 (1990) (arguing that equality
arguments are persuasive rhetoric used by the underdogs to attack their status); Richard
Hofstadter, The Founding Fathers: An Age of Realism, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLC 62, 63 (Robert H. Horwitz ed., 3d ed. 1986) ("Democratic ideas are
most likely to take root among discontented and oppressed classes, rising middle classes, or
perhaps some section of an old, alienated, and partially disinherited aristocracy, but they
do not appeal to a privileged class that is still amplifying its privileges."); Akhil R. Amar, The
Bill ofRights and the Fourteenth Amendment 101 YALE LJ. 1193, 1279 (1992) (arguing that the
Fourteenth Amendment reflected a shift in focus to represent outsiders); Rutherford,
supra note 38 passim (tracing egalitarian arguments back to the barons' demand for equal
treatment from the king in the Magna Carta).
48 "When the doctrines I have quoted ['all men are created equal' in the Declaration
of Independence] were announced, the original colonies were dependents. The instru-
ment that gave them to the world also abrogated the power of the Crown and declared the
colonies free and independent." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2614 (1864) (State-
ment of Rep. Morris).
49 Hofstadter, supra note 47, at 63.
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ernment structure designed to protect private property, and to ward
off factionalism and individual interest. Hence, the Framers con-
sciously structured the Constitution to create a republican form of
government intended to favor rule by well-educated and public-spir-
ited elites.50 Nevertheless, a form of structural equality was built into
the Constitution. Indeed, the entire system of checks and balances
that characterizes both the separation of powers and federalism was
driven by the need to limit power. The result of such limits on power
was to create a rough sort of equality at least among the elites. This
circumscribed equality required limits on any single source of power.
The Founding Fathers were well aware of the power of the pulpit.
They were familiar with the English Civil War that arose from Oliver
Cromwell's preaching, and were determined to limit the power of the
pulpit to disrupt the polity.5' They were also aware that during the
1730s revivals had swept through the colonies stirring up conflicts
with traditionalist churches, which were themselves rent by schisms.52
The widespread conflict united both religious groups and the Found-
ing Fathers to: (1) limit the political power of churches by separating
church and state; and (2) enact rules to reinforce the shared value of
religious toleration.53 During the revolutionary period, disparate
faiths shared a commitment to the doctrine of tolerance and opposed
state establishment of particular faiths.54 Accordingly, James Madison
argued for minimizing the power of the church by assuring the exis-
tence of a number of different sects.55
50 See generally CHARLE-s A. BFARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTTrU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES (1935) (arguing that the Framers served their own financial
interests in drafting a constitution strongly shaped by economic forces); JENNIFER NEDEL.
sxy, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990) (arguing
that the affluent Framers formed a government designed to protect elites and their private
property); and Hofstadter, supra note 47 (arguing that when they wrote the Constitution,
the Framers represented an upper class elite who nevertheless felt compelled to provide
some voice for the masses).
51 The Founding Fathers may also have patterned the American Revolution on the
Glorious Revolution of 1688 in which KingJames the II was forced off the throne, in part
out of fear of Catholicism. Richard B. Berstein, Charting the Bicentennia4 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1565, 1567 (1987); David S. Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REv.
429 (1983); Louis Henkin, Revolutions and Constitutions, 49 LA. L. REv. 1023, 1027 (1989);
Bruce Kempkes, The Natural Rights Clause of the Iowa Constitution: When the Law Sits Too Tigh
42 DRAKE L. REv. 593, 602-08 (1993); Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law
and the Idea of Independence, 80 WM & MARY L. REv. 801, 805 (1989).
52 Sidney E. Mead, American Protestantism During the Revolutionary Epoch, in RELIGION IN
AMERMAN HIsTOR. INTERPRETATE EssAys 162, 164-66 (John M. Mulder &John F. Wilson
eds., 1978).
53 Id.
54 See id. passim.
55 "A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confeder-
acy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national
councils against any danger from that source." THE FEDERAuST No. 10, at 84 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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Indeed, one reason to favor religious pluralism is a fear of the
combined power of church and state. That fear encompasses a fear of
the power of the church as well as the power of the state. This dual
fear creates the need for both the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Establishment Clause
helps avoid the combined power of church and state, 56 while the Free
Exercise Clause limits the power of the church by dividing that power
into many sources.57
By its term, the Establishment Clause directs that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... ,"58 At least
some of the framers of the First Amendment were strict separationists.
For example, Thomas Jefferson advocated a "wall of separation" be-
tween church and the state because he feared that religion would cor-
rupt the polity.59 James Madison also favored strict separation
because he thought separation would help prevent factionalism and
promote a more even balance of power.60 Much earlier, Roger Wil-
liams similarly argued that the separation of church and state is a
means of protecting religion from the corruption of the govern-
ment.61 Thus, the First Amendment was meant to protect both the
church and the state.
Although the Constitution divided power to create a rough sort
of equality, it was a paradoxical kind of equality at best. Only prop-
erty-owning white males were counted as equals. The original framers
of the Constitution feared a large and poor majority who might use
government to seize the property of the more affluent. 62 Accordingly,
the Constitution favored property rights and built the government
around the existence, if not the continuation, of slavery.65 Slaves
In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that
for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of inter-
ests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in
both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 324 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
56 William P. Marshall, The Inequality of Anti-establishment, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 63, 68-
71.
57 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). Cf Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766,
774-75 (D. Ariz. 1963) ("[L]ack of violation of the 'establishment clause' does not ipso
facto preclude violation of the 'free exercise clause.' For the former looks to the majority's
concept of the term religion, the latter the minority's.").
58 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
59 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 1159 (2d ed. 1988);
WILLS, supra note 13, at 350; William Van Alstyne, Comment, Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling
Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DuKE L.J. 770, 772 n.3.
60 Van Alstyne, supra note 59, at 770-71.
61 WILLS, supra note 13, at 341-53; Marshall, supra note 56, at 68.
62 See NEDELSKY, supra note 50; Rutherford, supra note 38.
63 The Constitution expressly guaranteed that slaves could be imported until 1808,
after which point Congress would be free to prohibit their importation. U.S. CONsT. art. I,
§ 9. Paul Finkelman argues that the Constitution, at least as interpreted by the federal
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could not vote and were counted as 3/5 of a person for purposes of
representation. 64 In contrast, free women were counted as an entire
person for purposes of representation, but could not vote. 65 There-
fore, although equality was an inherent part of due process that has
roots going back at least to the Magna Carta,66 it was not expressly
mentioned in the Constitution until the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
2. Reconstruction
At the time of the founding, women and African-Americans were
not only disenfranchised, but were treated as the property of others.67
This disparate treatment of some members of the community con-
flicted with the underlying notions of equality that supported the very
idea of the social contract. Consequently, egalitarian pressures
mounted in the form of the abolitionist movement and the emerging
women's rights movement. Although many of the abolitionists ex-
pressly based their arguments on religious views,68 politicians tended
to focus on the secular language of the Declaration of Independence.
Garry Wills credits the shift back to egalitarian notions of the Declara-
courts at the time, actually favored the national spread of slavery. PAUL FINRELMAN, AN
IMPERFECr UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 236-84 (1981).
64 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. Nevertheless, the Constitution anticipated that slavery
would gradually disintegrate and prohibited the importation of new slaves after 1808. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9. The 3/5 clause has been frequently cited as evidence of the racism built
into the Constitution. See, e.g., Raymond T. Diamond, No Call to Glory: Thurgood Marshall's
Thesis on the Intent of a Pro-Slavery Constitution, 42 VAND. L. REv. 93, 104-14 (1989);
Thurgood Marshall, The Constitution's Bicentennial: Commemorating the Wrong Document?, 40
VAND. L. REv. 1337, 1338 (1987); But see ROBERT A. GoLDwrN, WHY BLACKS, WOMEN, AND
JEws ARE NOT MENTIONED IN THE CONSTITUJTION, AND OTHER UNORTHODOX VIEWS 10-15
(1990) (arguing that the Constitution tried to compromise on the issue of slavery and was
as neutral as possible).
65 Women did not get the vote until 1920 when the Nineteenth Amendment was
adopted. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
66 For a fuller discussion of this history, see generally Rutherford, supra note 38.
67 Slaves are, by definition, the property of their masters. In England, wives were also
bought and sold on the open market: "[T)he sale of slaves and the sale of wives existed
independently; the abolition of the slave-trade had no effect on the trade in wives. Wives,
however, were a good deal cheaper to buy than slaves-and even cheaper than corpses."
CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACr 121 (1988). In the United States, the doctrine of
coverture during marriage established the husband and wife as one, and that one was the
husband. Id. at 119. Thus, the wife became legally invisible, even as property. See alsoVine
Deloria,Jr., Minorities and the Social Contract, 20 GA. L. REv. 917, 924 (1986) ("At the time of
the adoption of the Constitution two minorities, women and Blacks, were regarded as
someone else's property.").
68 See, e.g., David Brion Davis, The Emergence of Immediatism in British and American Anti-
slavery Though in RELIGION IN AMEmicAN HISTORY 236-53 (John M. Mulder &John F. Wil-
son eds., 1978) (examining the role of religious thought in the perpetuation of slavery);
CREEL, supra note 4 passim (considering socioreligious environment and community and
their effect on both slave and master); and WILLS, supra note 13, at 195-206 (discussing
politics and "black religion" from the time of Lincoln to that ofJesse Jackson).
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tion of Independence to Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. 69
Many politicians of the time harkened back to the Declaration's idea
of equality.70 Whatever the original source, these egalitarian refer-
ences to the Declaration of Independence were common and became
part of the legislative history of the Reconstruction Amendments.7'
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to alter the
prior Constitution dramatically. They were Radical Republicans with
a broad agenda to end past inequalities and change the structure of
the government, espousing many of the abolitionists' egalitarian argu-
ments. The Reconstruction Amendments and the Civil Rights Act of
1866 created a new order; they reconstructed government to protect
outsiders.7 2 Equality provided the unifying theme of the Fourteenth
Amendment,7 3 and replaced property as the constitutional priority.7 4
The Fourteenth Amendment amounted to a new paradigm:75 in-
dividual rights take precedence over states' rights, 76 and government
action is judged by its impact on equality.7 7 This new paradigm recast
both the Bill of Rights and the Constitution.78 As Justice Thurgood
69 "For most people now, the Declaration means what Lincoln told us it means, 'as a
way of correcting the Constitution itself without overthrowing it." GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN
AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA 147 (1992).
70 Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2614 (May 31, 1864) (statement of Rep. Morris discussing equality in society);
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumball explaining
how the Civil Rights Bill was intended to secure to citizens equal liberties as they were
intended to be secured by the Declaration of Independence).
71 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2614 (1864) (statement of Rep. Morris).
72 See generally Amar, supra note 47 passim (discussing the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, thus applying its countermajoritorian strictures
on government action to the states).
73 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 151-55 (1988); Rutherford,
supra note 38, at 71.
74 The radical Republicans who framed the Fourteenth Amendment may have had
selfish motives as well. They drafted the Amendment to preserve Republican party ascen-
dancy. Those goals, however, were embedded in egalitarian rhetoric. NELSON, supra note
73, at 18; JoEllen Lind, Dominance and Democracy: The Legacy of Woman Suffrage for the Voting
Right, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 103, 155-59 (1994).
75 See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
76 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 207 n.3 (1992) (WhiteJ., dissent-
ing) ("[T]he nature of federal-state relations changed fundamentally after the Civil War.
That conflict produced in its wake a tremendous expansion in the scope of the Federal
Government's law-making authority, so much so that the persons who helped to found the
Republic would scarcely have recognized the many added roles the National Government
assumed for itself.").
77 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
78 See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991) (arguing that the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments fundamentally changed the prior constitution both by adopting egalita-
rian values and by shifting power from the states to the federal government); Amar, supra
note 47, at 1197, 1278 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment subtly changed the Bill of
Rights to be more anti-majoritiarian and libertarian). But see Michael W. McConnell, The
Fourteenth Amendment: A Second American Revolution or the Logical Culmination of the Tradi-
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Marshall pointed out, the Reconstruction Amendments created a "dif-
ferent constitution":
While the Union survived the Civil War, the Constitution did not.
In its place arose a new, more promising basis for justice and equal-
ity, the fourteenth amendment, ensuring protection of the life, lib-
erty, and property of all persons against deprivations without due
process, and guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.79
The Reconstruction Amendments thus changed the very structure of
government under the Constitution. Hence, giving equal treatment
priority makes sense as a matter of textual construction. Amendments
are more than mere additions to the Constitution. They are, by defi-
nition, changes, not addenda. Accordingly, newer amendments
change the meaning of the prior document. The radical change em-
bodied in the Fourteenth Amendment requires a reinterpretation of
all that came before, including the Bill of Rights. As Akhil Amar ar-
gues, "the Fourteenth Amendment has reconstructed the meaning of
the Bill of Rights in both the popular and the legal mind."80 One of
the changes has been to debate which parts of the Bill of Rights are
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment to bind the states.
The goal, however, is not simply to apply parts of the Bill of
Rights under selective incorporation, but rather to reexamine the pre-
vious Constitution in light of the new egalitarian paradigm. A classic
example of this kind of rethinking is the way the Court construes the
Fifth Amendment. The Court added a Fourteenth Amendment gloss
to these provisions to make the Constitution consistent. The Four-
teenth Amendment clearly envisions that the government would not
discriminate against racial minorities, but the express language of sec-
tion 1 of the amendment says "No state... ."81 Theoretically, then,
the federal government is free to discriminate against minorities. In
order to avoid this anomaly, the Supreme Court reads the Equal Pro-
tection Clause into the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.8 2
tion?, 25 Loy. L.A. L. Ray. 1159 1160 (1992) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment
"represented philosophical continuity as well as change").
79 Marshall, supra note 64, at 1340-41. For a discussion ofJustice Marshall's views of
the Constitution, see Diamond, supra note 64.
80 Amar, supra note 47, at 1284.
81 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. (emphasis added).
82 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). In essence the Court held that une-
qual treatment is substantively arbitrary because inequality is an inadequate governing
principle. For a fuller discussion of this idea, see Rutherford, supra note 38; Kenneth L.
Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protectin, 55 N.C. L REv. 541 (1977). The
Court has consistently held that the Fifth Amendment requires the same equal protection
analysis as the Fourteenth Amendment. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 n.16
(1987); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,
638 n. 2 (1975); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
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Hence, the Fourteenth Amendment'changed the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment.
Analogously, reading the Constitution as a whole requires us to
reconsider how the Fourteenth Amendment may limit as well as ex-
pand other constitutional rights. 83 Just as the Court had to reinter-
pret the Fifth Amendment to make it consistent with the new
paradigm of the Reconstruction Amendments, it also needs to reinter-
pret other amendments and provisions of the Constitution.84 When-
ever possible, the older parts of the Constitution should be reconciled
with the demands of equality provided in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, but when conflicts occur, the egalitarian principles of the Four-
teenth Amendment should prevail.
This principle suggests that the First Amendment Religion
Clauses should be interpreted in ways that are consistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment paradigm of equality and participation. 85
Because the changes incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment
were meant to reorder constitutional priorities, when the Religion
Clauses clash with. the egalitarian goals of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the egalitarian principles must prevail. Therefore, statutes and
cases that exempt religious organizations from civil rights laws are
unconstitutional.
83 For a similar argument suggesting that we need to read the Constitution as a single
document, see Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131 (1991)
[hereinafter Amar, The Bill of Rights] (arguing for a unified reading of the Bill of Rights);
Akhil R. Amar, The Case of the MissingAmendments: RAVv. City of St. Paul, 106 HARv. L. Ray.
124 (1992) [hereinafter Amar, MissingAmendments] (arguing that free speech rights should
be construed in light of the Reconstruction Amendments).
84 See Becker, supra note 36 (arguing that the Bill of Rights generally and the First,
Second, and Fifth Amendments specifically, disfavor women). See also Amar, The Bill of
Rights, supra note 83 (arguing for a unified reading of the Bill of Rights). Other scholars
have argued that substantive equality requires new interpretations of the First Amendment
free speech as applied to pornography. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, Not a Moral Issue, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 146 (1987); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister. Pornog-
raphy, Civil Rights, and Speech, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra, at 163; Littleton, supra note
38; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, 71 B.U. L. REv.
793 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornog-
raphy, Abortion and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. Rav. 1 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography
and the First Amendment 1986 DuKE LJ. 589. Similarly, some scholars have argued that
substantive equality justifies the regulation of hate speech. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Racial
Insults and Free Speech Within the University, 79 GEO. L.J. 399 (1991); Richard Delgado, Cam-
pus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. Rv. 343 (1991);
Charles Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE
LJ. 431; Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32
WM. & MARY L. REv. 211 (1991); Marl Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering
the V rtim's Story, 87 MICH. L. Rav. 2320 (1989).
85 See Becker, supra note 36, at 484-86. See also Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the
Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in
the Constitution, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 91-92 (1990) ("The interpretation of particular consti-
tutional provisions, like the religion clauses, must adapt to changes that occur elsewhere in
the constitutional matrix.").
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Indeed, some of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment spe-
cifically intended to protect minority access to pulpits and religious
institutions. One of the principal drafters of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, John Bingham, argued both on the campaign trail and on the
floor of the House of Representatives that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment would stop states from imprisoning individuals for preaching.8 6
Similarly, Lyman Trumbull, the author of the Civil Rights Bill, intro-
duced the bill with a speech that emphasized "the need to protect the
freedom 'to teach' and 'to preach,' citing a Mississippi Black Code
punishing any 'free negroes and mulattoes who dared to exercis[e]
the functions of a minister of the Gospel.' 87 Trumbull's position was
particularly interesting because he supported the right of minorities
to have access to pulpits even though he did not support their right to
vote.88 Moreover, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were
aware that women were making similar claims.8 9
Of course, the examples given by the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment usually involved a conflict between a clergy member and
the state, rather than between a clergy member and her church. How-
ever, African-American preachers had been struggling for some time
to wrest control of their own congregations and church property from
religious affiliations controlled by whites. 90
86 Amar, supra note 47, at 1279.
87 Id. at 1278.
88 Id. at 1280.
89 The centrality of religious speech in the 1860's proved especially significant
for women. Though excluded from exercising the formal political rights of
voting, holding public office, and serving on juries or militias, women could
and did play leading roles in religious organizations. Moreover, these orga-
nizations engaged in moral crusades with obvious political overtones: tem-
perance, abolition, and (eventually) suffrage.
Id. at 1279.
Prominent 19th-century feminists, including those associated with the churches and
the abolitionist movement, pressed Congress to include women in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's protections, so the choice of the word "person" may have been a compromise that
left that possibility open to further development. That seems likely given the fact that
Section I of the amendment grants all "persons" equal rights, while Section II guarantees
the vote only to "male inhabitants." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. See Rutherford, supra note
38 (arguing for a more inclusive definition of the Fourteenth Amendment).
The Fourteenth Amendment should be read through the lens of the Nineteenth
Amendment that grants women the right to vote. Once women have political rights, it
seems silly to restrict their civil rights. Indeed, the express language of the Fourteenth
Amendment suggests broader civil than political rights.
90 See Sermon delivered in the African Bethel Church in the City of Baltimore on January 21,
1816, in I A DOcUMENTARY HisTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNrrED STATES, supra
note 9, at 67 (comparing the oppression of African-Americans in antebellum America to
that oppression ofJews depicted in the Bible).
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3. Universal Suffrage
The Fourteenth Amendment had a crucial flaw: it failed to guar-
antee either African-Americans or women the right to vote. Instead, it
implicitly condoned the disenfranchisement of women. Women were
to be counted as "persons" for purposes of apportioning representa-
tives whether or not they were permitted to vote. As a result, states
had an incentive to permit black males, but not women, to vote.91 In
spite of its commitment to equality for every "person," the Fourteenth
Amendment created express gender disparity in the text of the Consti-
tution for the first time.
Women were outraged. The early feminists, who had worked so
hard for the abolition of slavery, demanded that the reference to
"male" suffrage be removed from the text of the proposed amend-
ment.92 Nevertheless, the reference remained in the text. Conse-
quently, equality was circumscribed. The disenfranchised were
permitted equal protection of any laws the dominant groups chose to
enact, but were unable to participate directly in the democratic
process.
It took only two years for the problem to be corrected for black
males. In 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified providing:
"The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude."93 The amendment did not
create the right to vote, but merely limited the government's ability to
impair the pre-existing right to vote.
The Fifteenth Amendment completed the Reconstruction
amendments that established full legal equality for African-American
males. However, women of all colors continued to have partial equal-
ity that encompassed so-called "civil" rights, but not "political"
rights.94 It took another fifty years, until 1920, for women to secure
complete legal equality with the Passage of the Nineteenth
Amendment.
The delay between the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment
and the Nineteenth Amendment set the stage for infighting among
feminists and disputes between some feminists and their former allies
91 For an excellent discussion of the complex history behind these provisions, see
Lind, supra note 74.
92 Id. at 161-62 (citing ELLEN C. DuBois, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF
AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869, at 39 (1978)).
93 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
94 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (denying women the right to
vote, thereby creating a distinction between "civil" rights that were protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment and "political" rights that were not). For a discussion of the impact of
this dichotomy, see Akhil 1- Amar, Women and the Constitution, 18 HAtv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
465, 468 (1995).
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in the abolitionist movement.95 Women had to convince men to vol-
untarily cede political power. The quest for suffrage became a quest
for full equality both politically and symbolically.
The Nineteenth Amendment completed the constitutional com-
mitment to equality. It ended the distinction between "political" and
"civil" rights that had been used to justify restrictions on women.96 It
secured a constitutional place for women in the public square, and as
a result contributed to the rights of women as full participants on ju-
ries.97 Without the vote, women lacked direct political power and
were labeled as second class citizens with fewer rights, duties and
privileges.
The Fifteenth and the Nineteenth Amendments seem to be nar-
row ones that secure voting rights and little else. However, placed in
the context of the prior history, these two amendments assured far
more than the technical right to participate politically. Both symboli-
cally and pragmatically, they established the rights of African Ameri-
cans and women to be equal citizens with full rights in the
community.
B. Equality As a Source of Legitimacy
Even if the primacy of equality is not historically mandated, this
idea provides legitimacy for government rule. Otherwise, government
power rests solely on the implied threat of violence, rather than valid
authority.98 Such concerns for legitimacy are central to the constitu-
tional order.9 9
Equality has long served this function of legitimating government
control.'0 0 For example, egalitarian language was included in the
95 Lind, supra note 74 at 166-67.
96 See, e.g., Minor, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (holding that the right to vote was not an attri-
bute of citizenship); and Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (holding that
women could not be licensed to practice law because they did not belong in the public
sphere and were more naturally suited to be wives and mothers).
97 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). For a discussion of the relationship be-
tween the Nineteenth Amendment and the right to serve on juries, see Jennifer K Brown,
The Nineteenth Amendment and Women's Equality, 102 YALE L.J. 2175 (1993); Laura Gaston
Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and Politics of the Civil Jury, 80 CoPNEuJ-
L. REv. 325 (1995); Joanna L. Grossman, Note, Women'sJury Service: Right of Citizenship or
Privilege of Difference, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1115 (1994).
98 But see Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YA L.J. 1601 (1986) (describing
courts as imposing violence on others); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN.
L. REv. 739, 741 (1982) ("All law is masked power.").
99 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992)
("The Court's power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception
that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the
Nation's law means and declare what it demands.").
100 Peter Westen has argued that equality is merely a rhetorical device which can be
manipulated to support any position to grant legitimacy to the view expressed. WSrEN,
supra note 47.
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Magna Carta to legitimate the barons' armed demands for more polit-
ical power.'01 Similarly, the Declaration of Independence substituted
equality for the divine right of kings as a source of legitimacy.10 2
Equality is especially important as a source of legitimacy for demo-
cratic government. Democracy derives its legitimacy from the social
contract: the consent of the governed. 10 3 Those groups who did not
consent to the social contract are not bound by it.104 To be bound,
the parties must have a chance to negotiate the terms of the social
contract. Several groups were excluded from the original bargaining
process: Native Americans, slaves, and women.
Some might argue that none of us bargained for the terms of the
social contract of government. We simply inherited it from those who
arrived earlier. However, some of us inherited the privileges that were
the result of being represented by similarly situated groups at the
founding. 0 5 Others had no such representation. As Cass Sunstein
notes, excluding African-Americans, women, Native Americans, and
those without property from political participation altered the very
way in which the nation defined the public good.10 6
Some of the Founders were aware of this problem. The anti-fed-
eralists, who were responsible for the addition of the Bill of Rights to
the Constitution, noted the problem of under-representation of cer-
tain classes and races. 10 7 For example, Brutus argued that representa-
tives should "bear the strongest resemblance" to those they
represented, and noted that the 3/5 clause together with the small
number of representatives, assured that slaves, farmers, and trades-
men would be excluded from the polity.'08 Indeed, Brutus accurately
101 Rutherford, supra note 38, at 8-11.
102 Wius, supra note 13.
103 See LocKE, supra note 43, at 285; JEAN-JAcQuES RoussEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRAcr
(Christopher Betts trans., Oxford University Press, 1994) (1762); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OFJuSTIcE 11-17 (1971); CarlJ. Friedrich, A Brief Discourse on the Origins of Political Equality,
in EQUAUITY. NoMos IX, supra note 4, at 222 (arguing that political equality flows from
democratic legitimacy).
104 See, e.g., David Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent,
and Community in Federal Indian Law, 80 VA. L. REv. 403, 404 (1994) (arguing that Native
Americans have never consented to a social contract with the United States government,
and therefore consent to a social contract cannot explain Congressional authority to gov-
ern Native American tribes).
105 Cf Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (holding that white firefighters could
not be bound by civil rights consent decree because they were not adequately represented
in the lawsuit that led to the consent decree).
106 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Reviva 97 Yale LJ. 1539 (1988).
107 Brutus, To the Citizens of the State of New-York (Nov. 15, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE AN-r-FEDERALIST 377-82 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1981).
108 Id. at 380.
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predicted that the "natural aristocracy" would control the federal
legislature. 109
For those who were unrepresented at the founding, the current
constitutional structure is legitimate only if they now have enough
power not only to participate in the political process, but also to
change the rules that were drafted in their absence. Thus the crucial
question becomes what kind of equality is required to legitimate the
constitutional regime.
Equality can be defined at least two ways: (1) formal equality; and
(2) substantive equality. °10 Formal equality calls for identical treat-
ment, and does not allow for existing differences, while substantive
equality requires individualized treatment to yield equal opportu-
nity."' For example, imagine designing an oval course for a footrace.
The designer using a principle of formal equality would draw a single
starting line across the track. It would be formally equal to treat the
runners identically. However, it would be substantively equal to real-
ize that those running on the outside of the oval would have farther to
run than those on the inside. Therefore, a principle of substantive
equality would require the designer to create a series of starting lines
so that each runner would run the same distance to the finish line.
The single starting line is equal in the sense that it starts all the run-
ners in an identical place, but it gives those on the inside track an
advantage. The multiple starting lines are not identical, but they
109 Id. In 1994, more than one quarter of all United States Senators were millionaires,
and there were at least fifty millionaires in the House of Representatives. Glenn R. Simp-
son, Of the Rich, By the Rich, For the Rich: Are Congress's Millionaires Turning OurDemocracy Into
Plutocracy?, WASH. Pos-r, Apr. 17, 1994, at C4. See also Steven Thomma, With Money It's No
Contest: Rich Find it Easier to Get Into Congress, DEf. FREE PRESS, May 25, 1994, at IA (ranking
the wealthiest members of Congress with net worths ranging from $50 million to $400
million). Wealthy people are more able to raise the money needed to run expensive cam-
paigns. For example, Michael Huffington spent $25 million of his own fortune running
for the Senate in 1994. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., The 1994 Campaign: California, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 1994, at 27.
110 Of course, other definitions are possible. For example, John Donohue describes
three different sorts of equality- contingent, intrinsic, and constructed. John J. Donohue
III, Employment Discrimination Law in Perspective: Three Concepts of Equality, 92 MICH. L. REv.
2583 (1994). Similarly, Cass Sunstein defines equality as an "anti-caste" principle. Cass R.
Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MicaH. L. REv. 2410 (1994). What I call "substantive"
equality shares certain characteristics with other forms of equality that have slightly differ-
ent valences. Thus, although I draw the distinction between formal equality and substan-
tive equality, Christine Littleton distinguishes between "assimilation" and "acceptance,"
and Catharine MacKinnon compares "difference" and "anti-domination." Compare Lit-
tleton, supra note 38 with CATmHUErN A. MACKINON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Dis-
crimination, in FEamit'SM UNMODIFIED, supra note 84, at 32-45.
Ill See MARTHA MrNow, MAKING ALL THE DFaFERENcE: INCLUSION, ExCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAw 43-47 (1990); Littleton, supra note 38; MacKinnon, supra note 38; Ruther-
ford, supra note 38, at 65-78; Robin West, The Meaning of Equality and the Interpretive Turn,
66 CHr-KEN L. REv. 451, 469 (1990). Kenneth Karst also sees equality as a substantive
concept and refers to it as "equal citizenship". KARsT, supra note 38, at 3.
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equalize the distance to be covered. Those individuals who have been
excluded from the social contract for generations are like the runners
on the outside of the track. They have much farther to go to get to
the finish line.112 If we treat them identically to those who have been
part of the social contract for years, we merely perpetuate existing dif-
ferences. Therefore, our constitutional structure, which has given the
inside track to some citizens," 3 must provide substantive equality to
be legitimate.
We have come to understand that, at a minimum, those originally
excluded must have political access: "[M]en ought to be provided
with the opportunity to acquire enough equality in politically relevant
respects to enable them to participate effectively in the processes
which democratic legitimacy presupposes."" 4  Consequently, we
passed the Fifteenth Amendment granting African-American males
the right to vote, and the Nineteenth Amendment granting women
the right to vote." 5 Moreover, the Court has recognized that the
right to vote must be allocated equally in the concept of one person,
one vote." 6 Mere political access, however, will not redress the
problems created when some individuals were given the inside track.
So long as various groups remain subordinated, they suffer a substan-
tial disadvantage." 7 At the very least, we must carefully scrutinize ex-
isting statutes and case law to see if they perpetuate subordination.",8
When religions discriminate they both reinforce subordination" 9 and
deny political access. 120 Therefore, some cases and statutes specifi-
cally have authorized religious institutions to allocate the inside track
by limiting access to pulpits.12 1
112 I am grateful to my dear friend M. Corinne Crammer for suggesting this analogy to
me.
113 As we have seen, those on the inside track at the founding were those granted the
right to vote: white, male property owners.
114 Friedrich, supra note 103, at 222.
115 U.S. CONsr. amends. XV, XIX.
116 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Unfortunately, the Court seems to apply that
principle only in a formal sense, rejecting the substantive equality argument for racially
conscious redistricting plans of Miller v.Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). The Miller Court
permitted all other characteristics, including political party, incumbency, and geography,
to be considered in redistricting plans, but refused to consider the impact of the single
largest disadvantage faced by Americans-race.
117 See Littleton, supra note 38; MACKINNON, supra note 110, at 32-45; Sunstein, supra
note 106.
118 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
119 See generally DALY, supra note 15, at 132 (quoting Hindu, Jewish, Islamic, and Chris-
tian texts to support her argument that religion generally subordinates women); Becker,
supra note 36, at 459 (arguing that although religion has provided some benefits to wo-
men, in general it has contributed to their subordination).
120 See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
121 See supra notes 1-5, 7-12 and accompanying text.
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C. Equality as an Instrument to Protect Other Constitutional
Values
Finally, making equality the most important constitutional value
is necessary to protect other important constitutional rights. When
people are subordinated, they may be silenced in ways that impinge
on other individual rights. 122 Equality facilitates the exercise of other
constitutional rights like speech 123 and religion; inequality inhibits
them.124
On this understanding of the Constitution, Fourteenth Amend-
ment equality principles and First Amendment principles of religion
are mutually reinforcing. Often the First and the Fourteenth Amend-
ments serve similar purposes: to protect minority views. First Amend-
ment principles that prohibit the government from discriminating
among religions reinforce the equality principles of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thus, rules that require the government to treat reli-
gions equally are appropriate.
Indeed, as John Locke noted over 300 years ago, some notion of
equality is essential to enforce religious tolerance:
The Sum of all we drive at is, That every Man may enjoy the same Rights
that are granted to others....
IT]hose whose Doctrine is peaceable ... ought to be upon equal
Terms with their Fellow-Subjects. Thus if Solemn Assemblies, Ob-
servations of Festivals, public Worship, be permitted to any one sort
of Professors; all these things ought to be permitted to the Presbyteri-
ans, Independents, Anabaptists, Arminians, Quakers, and others, with
the same Liberty.... [N] either Pagan, nor Mahumetan, nor Jew,
122 See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Subor-
dination of Groups, 1990 U. IL. L. REv. 95, 109-12.
123 Two interests are crucial in free speech: the right to be heard and the right to hear
others. Both interests inhere in free speech itself, whether we view speech as a quest for
truth or as a part of the political process. Neither the right to speak nor to hear have much
value without equality. As Justice Black suggested, we must protect the "poorly financed
causes of little people." Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (holding that the
First Amendment protects the right to distribute handbills door to door). If only the rich
or powerful can get access to speak, we hear only part of the story. Instead of a free and
open marketplace of ideas, the market becomes a closed monopoly. For example, in a
recent campaign finance case, the issue was whether campaign finance limits on corpora-
tions infringed upon First Amendment rights. The Court held that corporations had an
unfair advantage in the political marketplace because of their state-created ability to amass
wealth; accordingly, corporations could purchase more political clout with their campaign
contributions. Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). The
Court distinguished a long line of cases, including Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) and
FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 288 (1986). Churches, like corpora-
tions, also have special state-created privileges that mayjustify intrusions to equalize access.
Once speech becomes a commodity allocated only to the mighty, it becomes diminished in
value, even for the powerful.
124 William P. Marshall, Truth and the Religion Clauses, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 243, 246
(1994).
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ought to be excluded from the Civil Rights of the Commonwealth,
because of his Religion.' 25
Both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, at least in
part, rely on equality. We are all equally free to exercise our faiths,
and no faith can gain dominance by becoming an established arm of
the state. Equality is so central to religious freedoms that some schol-
ars have suggested that it should be an important standard for mea-
suring religious liberty. 126
Merely formal equality, however, is not sufficient to protect mi-
nority religious practices. For example, consider Employment Division
v. Smith. 12 7 In Smith, the state had prohibited the use of peyote with-
out making any exceptions for its sacramental use by Native Ameri-
cans. The Court sustained the regulation because it was a "'neutral
law of general applicability."' 12 8 By focusing on the issue of "neutral-
ity," the Court failed to see the problem of inequality. The question
should have been whether the law treated substance abuse in Native
American religions (sacramental peyote use) differently from sub-
stance abuse in mainstream Christian religions (sacramental alcohol
consumption by minors). Under a scheme of formal equality, this dif-
ference is irrelevant because Native Americans are treated identically
to the majority (both prohibited from using peyote).
Conversely, substantive equality could have solved the problem.
Substantive equality would have required individualized treatment to
assure equal opportunity, in this case an equal opportunity to engage
in sacramental practices. Accordingly, both Christians and Native
Americans would have equal rights to engage in sacraments. The fact
that the sacraments involve different substances and are not governed
by the same regulatory acts would be irrelevant. Thus, substantive
equality helps to bolster the notion of accommodation to religious
differences that is part of the Free Exercise Clause.
The Court seemed to move toward notions of substantive equality
in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. Hialeah.129 The issue was
whether the city of Hialeah could ban animal sacrifices that were part
of Santeria religious practices. In overturning the ordinance, the
125 JOHN LocKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOL.ERATON 53-54 (James H. Tully ed., 1983)
(1689).
126 See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of
Religion, 102 HAv. L. REv. 933, 984 (1989) ("In the religion clause context, the principle
of equal protection can be articulated in a straightfonvard manner-the state may not create
disadvantageous distinctions intentionally based upon the religious character of an affiliation orprac-
tice....").
127 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
128 Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
129 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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Court noted that the city had singled out the Santeria. The city per-
mitted other forms of animal slaughter, from kosher butchers to veter-
inarians. Only the Santeria religious sacrifices were prohibited.
Although the Court was on the ight track in Lukumi, it fell short of
fully developing the notion of substantive equality because it limited
its holding to instances in which the government intentionally discrimi-
nated against a religious group. As the Smith case suggests, however,
discrimination is no less harmful when it is inadvertent. Indeed, many
minorities suffer because their viewpoints and needs are simply invisi-
ble to the dominant class.' 30 Substantive equality is less concerned
with intent than with the consequences of unequal opportunities.
As Smith and Lukumi illustrate, freedom of religion has little
meaning if it can only be exercised by an elite. Consequently, only a
robust understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment commitment to
equality can satisfactorily reinforce the First Amendment commitment
to free religion.
II
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RIGHTS OF
THE RELIGIOUS EMPLOYEE AND THE
RELIGIOUS EMPLOYER
Occasionally, however, the principles of equality and religious
freedom seem to conflict. That conflict arises in employment discrim-
ination cases filed against religious institutions. When the state carves
out special exceptions to otherwise applicable laws that enable reli-
130 Sojourner Truth, a former slave, eloquently expressed her sense of invisibility as an
African-American woman in her famous speech in 1851. Sojourner Truth, Ain't I A
Woman?, in MARY BECKER Er AL., FEMrINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 9
(1994). See also D. MarvinJones, No Timefor Trumpets: Title V, Equality, and the Fin de Siecle,
92 MICH. L. REv. 2311, 2334-42 (1994) (arguing that Enlightenment ideas of rationality
influence the majority culture to believe that discrimination is a problem of intentionally
racist individuals, while African-Americans see discrimination not as an intentional act, but
as an all-encompassing cultural artifact that is almost invisible to whites in most contexts);
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 330 (1987) (arguing that racism is "much more complex than
either the conscious conspiracy of a power elite or the simple delusion of a few ignorant
bigots. It is a part of our common historical experience and, therefore, a part of our
culture. It arises from the assumptions we have learned to make about the world, our-
selves, and others as well as from the patterns of our fundamental social activities."); DER-
RICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QuEsr FOR RACIALJUSTICE (1987); Martha
Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VI: Some Contemporary In-
fluences, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2370, 2385-94 (1994) (describing what the author calls the "cul-
tural domination" theory).
Minority religions, like other disfavored groups, may also be invisible to the majority.
Indeed, Judge Posner has argued that protecting such faiths from "legislation not moti-
vated by any animus toward minor sects but merely insensitive to their interests-possibly
even oblivious to their existence" may be the purpose of the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act. Sasnett v. Sullivan 91 F.3d 1018, 1021 (7th Cir. 1996).
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gious employers to discriminate, a number of constitutional interests
are affected. Both the employer's and the employee's right to freely
exercise religion may be at stake. Similarly, the government may deny
equal protection of its anti-discrimination laws to various races, gen-
ders, ages, or disabled persons. The state is caught in a dilemma be-
cause either enforcing or creating an exemption from civil rights
statutes chooses sides. This dilemma arises from a conflict among in-
dividuals, religious groups, and the state. These disputes reflect a
competition over which values are the most important,13' both within
the community of faith and outside in the larger polity.' 3 2 As Profes-
sor John Valauri points out, the state cannot be a non-participant in
such situations. 3 3 It chooses sides by either enforcing the statutes
against religious employers or exempting them from statutes that ap-
ply to all other employers. Either way, the state acts.
A. State Action: The Statutory and Common-Law Imprimatur
on Discrimination
Employees only can challenge the constitutionality of these dis-
criminatory laws if the employees establish state action. 34 To meet
this requirement, the claimants must both identify state actors and
explain how those actors have discriminated. Identifying the state ac-
tors is easy: the laws are created by Congress, state legislatures, and
131 Nomi Maya Stolzenberg & David N. Myers, Community, Constitution, and Culture: The
Case of theJewish Kehilah, 25 U. MICH.J.L. REr. 633, 633 (1992) ("[T]he self-definition of a
community emerges out of a perpetual contest for cultural authority in which the terms of
identity are constantly challenged and revised.").
132 For example, the Church of Latter Day Saints' decision to outlaw polygamy for its
members was undoubtedly influenced by government pressure. Nomi Stolzenberg and
David Myers argue that it is impossible to separate the internal and external influences on
group definition. Stolzenberg & Myers, supra note 131.
133 SeeJohn T. Vaauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U.
PrIr. L. REv. 83, 91 (1986). A number of scholars have suggested that it is impossible for
the state to be "neutral" in such situations. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES
NATURALLY- CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUD-
IES 227, 488, 522 (1989) (arguing that no neutral viewpoint exists); MARTHA MINOW, MAK-
ING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAw (1990); MICHAEL J.
PERRY, MORALITY, POLrICS, AND Lw 67 (1988) ("There is no neutral standpoint.").
134 A number of critics have attacked the state action requirement, arguing that the
equal protection clause requires states to protect their citizens from private discrimination.
See, e.g.,Jones, supra note 130, at 2331-32;JACoBuS TENBROEK, THE ANTSLAVERY ORIGINS OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 97 (1951). See also, Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Ac-
tion, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 503 (1985); Robin West, Toward an Abolitionist Interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment 94 W. VA. L. REV. 111, 129 (1991). Others have argued for dispens-
ing with the requirement for state action. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: "State
Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69 (1967); Harold
W. Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S.
CAL. L. REv. 203 (1957); Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A
Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. Rv. 39; Harold W. Horowitz & Ken-
neth L. Karst, The Proposition Fourteen Cases: Justices in Search of aJustification, 14 UCLA L.
REv. 37 (1966).
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the courts. The mechanisms the government uses are the traditional
vehicles of state action: statutes and court decisions. Statutes condon-
ing discrimination clearly constitute state action. Courts act on behalf
of the state as well. Nearly half a century ago, the Supreme Court held
that courts which condone private discrimination engage in state
action. 135
Although it seems as if the religious institutions are the biased
actors, the state is not merely a passive observer of private discrimina-
tion. Religious organizations are able to discriminate because the
state explicitly grants them the right to do so with specific exemptions
from civil rights laws. Consequently, courts and legislatures embed
prejudice in the law by creating both statutory and common-law ex-
emptions. Congress enacted an express exception in the employment
discrimination statute (Title VII) for religious employers that discrimi-
nate on the basis of religion.'36 That provision permits religions to
fire or refuse to hire employees for religious reasons. By providing
protection from discrimination for employees in general, but exclud-
ing religious employees, the state acts. As Alan Brownstein explains:
"Title VII... is one of selective, not general, inaction. It prohibits
many forms of employment discrimination while permitting only cer-
tain groups to discriminate against particular minorities. The ... dis-
criminatory distinctions are clearly state action which must be justified
against constitutional challenge."' 3 7
The statutory exemption allows only discrimination based on reli-
gion, and then only with respect to persons hired to carry out the
employer's "religious activities." Congress specifically rejected propos-
als to broaden the scope of the exemption further. The Supreme
Court upheld this exemption, finding that it was merely an accommo-
dation of religion. 138
In contrast, Congress chose to prohibit religious employers from
discriminating on account of race, sex, or national origin.139 Accord-
ingly, several courts have held that religious institutions cannot dis-
criminate on the basis of race, sex, age, or disability when employing
135 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that court approval of private dis-
crimination constituted state action).
136 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1994).
137 Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentation
and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 89, 170
(1990).
138 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (allowing the church to discriminate on the basis of religion by
firing ajanitor in a gymnasium because he was not a practicing Morman).
139 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1984); Disability
Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1213 (1994); H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2391, 2402.
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teachers, secretaries, and publishers. 14° Nevertheless, contrary to the
language of the statute, courts have created a common-law exception
for race, sex, and age discrimination against clergy.141 Such court-
imposed rules specifically authorizing discrimination amount to state
action.
B. The Effect of Employment Discrimination on the
Constitutional Rights of Religious Employees
When the government authorizes religious institutions to discrim-
inate, it impinges on the constitutional rights of those excluded. Dis-
crimination on account of race, sex, creed, national origin,142 age, 14 3
or disability'" is prohibited by federal statutes. These civil rights stat-
utes reflect a constitutional value favoring equal protection. Indeed,
the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the authority to adopt
legislation to enforce the provisions of the amendment. 145
The harms associated with discrimination are deep and well doc-
umented. 146 Discrimination creates factions within society that
threaten stable government and subordinate individuals unjustly. Ra-
cial discrimination has its roots in slavery, our most shameful institu-
tion, and prevents individuals from fully participating as "equal
citizens." 147 The Court consistently has ruled that the state has a com-
pelling interest in eradicating racial and sexual discrimination. 148
140 Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish School, 7 F.3d 324 (3d Cir.
1993) (holding that application of ADEA to lay faculty of religious school does not violate
the First Amendment); DeMarco v. Holy Cross High School, 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993)
(holding that ADEA applies to religious institutions). Contra Weissman v. Congregation
Shaare Emeth, 839 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Mo. 1993) (holding that ADEA claim does not apply
to a claim against a Temple); Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991); EEOC v. Pacific
Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that Congress intended to
prohibit religious organizations from discriminating among their employees on the basis
of sex, race, or national origin, and that employees are not exempt from EEOC coverage).
141 Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 320 (1994); Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-
Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986); Minker v.
Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 699 F. Supp. 954 (D.D.C.
1988), modified, 894 F.2d 1354 (1990); Turner v. Parsons, 620 F. Supp. 138 (E.D. Pa. 1985),
affd, 787 F.2d 584 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1160 (1986); McClure v. Salvation Army,
323 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ga. 1971), affd, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
896 (1972).
142 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994).
143 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
(1994).
144 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994).
145 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
146 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Becker, supra note 36.
147 KARsT, supra note 38.
148 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149
(1987); BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Crawford v. Board of Educ.,
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Nevertheless, religious employers often are granted either statutory or
judicial exceptions from anti-discrimination laws.' 49 Governmentally
sanctioned discrimination causes three distinct constitutional harms
to those excluded: (1) they fail to get equal protection of the laws; (2)
they lose free exercise rights to follow their own faith; and (3) they are
deterred from participating and speaking both spiritually and
politically.
1. Employees' Equal Protection Rights
Religious entities are the last bastion of employers who are per-
mitted to purposefully discriminate against their employees. Federal
statues prohibit other employers from discriminating on account of
race, sex, creed, national origin,'50 age,15' or disability.'5 2 These stat-
utes embody a constitutional value favoring equal protection that is
explicit in the Fourteenth Amendment 5 3 and implicit in the Fifth
Amendment. 5 4
Although the definition of equality under the Fourteenth
Amendment is open to debate, arguably it requires substantive equal-
ity rather than merely formal equality. As noted earlier, substantive
equality provides individualized treatment to yield equal opportu-
nity.' 55 In contrast, formal equality calls for identical treatment, not
allowing for existing differences.' 56 The theories serve two different
purposes: Formal equality merely aims at identical treatment, while
substantive equality is designed to combat subordination. The issue is
important in defining which groups should be protected. Substantive
equality is concerned with balancing power. 157  Excluding
subordinated groups, therefore, is more problematic than excluding
dominant groups. Thus, white churches that exclude African-Ameri-
458 U.S. 527 (1982); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 496 (1980) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (referring to the "compelling governmental interest in eradicating the continuing
effects of past discrimination").
149 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1994); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Young v. Northern Ill. Con-
ference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 320
(1994).
150 Civil Rights Act of 1964 §701, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. (1994).
151 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 §2 et seq., 29 U.S.C. §621 et seq.
(1994).
152 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §12112 (1994).
153 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
154 See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that the Fifth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause, although broader than the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause, embraces similar principles of equality).
155 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
156 See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
157 Equality is about more than who holds what positions. Holding influential posi-
tions is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to arriving at a more just balance of
power.
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can clergy should raise far more concern than black churches that
exclude white clergy. However, African-American churches that ex-
clude older employees, women, or the disabled also raise serious con-
cerns because these groups may be subordinated within their
churches. 158
Of course, defining which groups are powerful can be problem-
atic. The Supreme Court focuses on immutability, a history of dis-
crimination, lack of political access, and discrete and insular status as
the hallmarks of powerlessness, that trigger heightened scrtiny.159
Using those criteria, other groups not currently covered by federal
anti-discrimination laws could qualify for protection. 160
Religious employers are permitted to discriminate in ways that
would not be tolerated for any other employer, so the employees
often sue.161 Most of the cases are not discriminatory hiring suits, but
158 These categorizations are not uncontested. For example, it could be argued that
African-American men, unlike white men, are disadvantaged compared to same race wo-
men. Current income statistics would support that conclusion.
159 The Court first suggested heightened (also called strict) scrutiny for discrimination
against discrete and insular minorities in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 804 U.S.
144, 153 n.4 (1938). More recent decisions have identified four characteristics that war-
rant strict scrutiny: immutability, a history of discrimination, lack of political access, and
discrete and insular status. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987); Lyng v.
Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986).
160 The classic example is homosexuals. Although it has acknowledged such an inter-
est in eradicating several other forms of discrimination, the Court never has held that the
state has a compelling state interest in eradicating discrimination against gays. The Court,
however, may very well be wrong in refusing to extend equal protection to homosexuality.
Discrimination against gays seems just as invidious as any other form of discrimination and
wholly unjustified by any articulated state interest.
The Catholic Church has side-stepped the issue by requiring the clergy to be celibate.
Hence, the Church does not discriminate by prohibiting homosexual relations: it also pro-
hibits heterosexual relations. Although requiring celibacy may contribute to other
problems for the Church, it is not unconstitutional or even a statutory violation. That
answer does not work for most religions, however.
In essence, within the framework the Court has adopted, the argument comes down to
whether homosexuality is an immutable trait like sex, race, age, and disability. If so, then
churches should not be able to discriminate on the basis of a status that the individual
cannot readily change. If, however, homosexuality is merely a behavioral choice, like eat-
ing meat on Friday, then discrimination may be tolerated although not applauded. It is
not necessary to resolve this issue to support the central thesis of this Article: that churches
should not discriminate in employment.
161 See, e.g., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Lat-
ter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Ohio Civil Rts. Commission v. Dayton Chris-
tian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986); Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish
Sch., 7 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 1993); DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir.
1993); E.E.O.C. v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 439 (1993); Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991); Scharon v. St. Luke's
Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991); Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist
Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 846 (1990); Minker v. Baltimore
Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Tagatz v.
Marquette Univ., 861 F.2d 1040 (7th Cir. 1988); Maguire v. Marquette Univ., 814 F.2d 1213
(7th Cir. 1987); Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1986); Hutchison
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rather benefits or discharge cases. Consequently, the religious em-
ployers originally found the employees to be qualified for their posi-
tions by whatever standards the religious organizations use. Often
courts refuse to consider such suits on First Amendment religious lib-
erty grounds, especially when the employee is a member of the
clergy.162
v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885 (1986); E.E.O.C. v. Fremont
Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986); Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-
Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), cet. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986); Fike v.
United Methodist Children's Home of Va., Inc., 709 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1983); Larsen v.
Kirkham, 1982 WL 20024 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983);
E.E.O.C. v. Pacific Press PublishingAss'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982); E.E.O.C. v. South-
western Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
905 (1982); E.E.O.C. v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453
U.S. 912 (1981); Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974); McClure v.
Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), art. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972); Maness v. Friendly
Ave. Baptist Church Weekday Learning Ctr., Inc., No. 2:19CV00410, 1993 WL 155375
(M.D.N.C. Feb. 26, 1993); Weissman v. Congregation Shaare Emeth, 839 F. Supp. 680
(E.D. Mo. 1993), rev'd, 38 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 1994); Stouch v. Brothers of the Order of
Hermits of St. Augustine, 836 F. Supp. 1134 (E.D. Penn. 1993); Vigars v. Valley Christian
Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Elbaz v. Congregation Beth Judea,
Inc., 812 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Yost v. W. Pa.-W. Va. Synod of the Lutheran Church
in America, 789 F. Supp. 191 (W.D. Pa. 1992); E.E.O.C. v. Presbyterian Ministries, Inc., 788
F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Wash. 1992); Lukaszewski v. Nazareth Hosp., 764 F. Supp. 57 (E.D. Pa.
1991); E.E.O.C. v. Tree of Life Christian Schs., 751 F. Supp. 700 (S.D. Ohio 1990); Heint-
zelman v. St. Mary's Medical Ctr. of Evansville, Inc., No. EV 87-203-C 1989 WL 247140 (S.D.
Ind. Jan. 10, 1989); Cochran v. St. Louis Prep. Seminary, 717 F. Supp. 1413 (E.D. Mo.
1989); Carter v. Baltimore Annual Conference, Civ. A. No. 86-2543SSH, 1987 WL 18470
(D.D.C. October 5, 1987); Ninth & 0 Street Baptist Church v. E.E.O.C., 633 F. Supp. 229
(W.D. Ky. 1986); Seattle Pacific Univ. v. Haas, 626 F. Supp. 539 (W.D. Wash. 1985); Graves
v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 624 F. Supp. 429 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Turner v. Barber-Scotia
College, 604 F. Supp. 1450 (M.D. N.C. 1985); Feldstein v. Christian Science Monitor, 555
F. Supp. 974 (D. Mass. 1983); Russell v. Belmont College, 554 F. Supp. 667 (M.D. Tenn.
1982); Harvey v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 533 F. Supp. 949 (W.D. N.C. 1982);
Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College 495 F. Supp. 724 (D. Md. 1980); Dolter v. Wahlert High
Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980); Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); C.H.R.O. v. Archdiocesan School Office,
522 A.2d 781 (Conn.), appeal dismissed, 484 U.S. 805 (1987); Gay Rights Coalition of Ge-
orgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987); Murray v.
Kobayashi, 431 P.2d 940 (Haw. 1967); Madsen v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985);
Molberg v. Apostolic Bible Inst., No. C9-91-1448, 1992 WL 67518 (Minn. Ct. App. April 7,
1992); Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct App. 1991); Speer v. Presbyterian Chil-
dren's Home and Serv. Agency, 824 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), vacated 847 S.W.2d
227 (Tex. 1993); Hazen v. Catholic Credit Union, 681 P.2d 856 (Wash. Ct App. 1984).
162 See, e.g., Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d
184 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 320 (1994) (dismissing a suit by a pastor alleging sex
and race discrimination); Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d
324 (3d Cir. 1993); DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993); Scharon v.
St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hospitals, 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991); Minker v. Balti-
more Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
Tagatz v. Marquette University, 861 F.2d 1040 (7th Cir. 1988); Turner v. Parsons, 787 F.2d
584 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1160 (1986); Rayburn v. General Conference of
Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986)
(age discrimination); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied
409 U.S. 896 (1972); Weissman v. Congregation Shaare Emeth, 839 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Mo.
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Religious employees' suits involve two different kinds of govern-
ment discrimination. First, by providing a benefit-protection from
employment discrimination-generally to employees, but denying
such a benefit only to religious employees, the government discrimi-
nates on the basis of religion. For example, Reverend Young was
treated differently because of her religion when the court refused her
Title VII protections otherwise available.163 Second, because only
members of disfavored groups need the benefit, the government also
discriminates on the basis of race, sex, alienage, pregnancy, age, or
disability. Reverend Young, for instance, only needs Title VII protec-
tion because she is an African-American woman. In her case, the
court's refusal to apply Title VII discriminates against her on three
counts: (1) because she is a pastor, (2) because she is a woman, and
(3) because she is African-American. Hence the discrimination is very
similar to the old slave codes that prohibited African-Americans from
becoming ministers. 16 The slave codes, like these laws, discriminated
on both race and religion.
Such discrimination furnishes a benefit to non-religious employ-
ees that is not provided to religious employees. But even on the
model of formal equality, government protection must be provided
on an equal basis if it is provided at all. Municipalities, for example,
must provide the same services to black neighborhoods as white
ones.165 Government must provide equal protection to both the reli-
gious and the secular. The police could not refuse to break up a fight
on church property merely because they risked intervening in a reli-
gious dispute, for religious individuals are entitled to the same police
protection as non-religious individuals.' 66 Similarly, religious employ-
1993), rev'd38 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 1994); Stouch v. Brothers of the Order of Hermits of St.
Augustine, 836 F. Supp. 1134 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Maness v. Friendly Ave. Baptist Church
Weekday Learning Ctr., Inc., No. 2:19CV00410, 1993 WL 155375 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 26,
1993); Piasecki v. Daughters of Jacob Nursing Home, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1136 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); Lukaszewski v. Nazareth Hosp., 764 F. Supp. 57 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Cochran v. St.
Louis Preparatory Seminary, 717 F. Supp. 1413 (E.D. Mo. 1989); U.S. Dep't of Labor v.
Shenandoah Baptist Church, 707 F. Supp. 1450 (W.D. Va. 1989), affd, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied 498 U.S. 846 (1990); Graves v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 624 F. Supp.
429 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Hafnrer v. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 616 F. Supp. 735 (N.D.
Ind. 1985); Russell v. Belmont College, 554 F. Supp. 667 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); Ritter v.
Mount St. Mary's College, 495 F. Supp. 724 (D. Md. 1980).
163 See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
164 See supra notes 1-7, 86-90 and accompanying text.
165 See, e.g., Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983); Hawkins v.
Shaw, Miss., 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), affld on reb'g, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972);
Johnson v. Arcadia, Fla., 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
166 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993) (suggesting that an
interpretation of the Establishment Clause that prohibited police or fire protection for
churches was "absurd").
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ees are entitled to the same protection from discrimination as non-
religious employees. 16 7
Courts discriminate on the basis of religion in most of these em-
ployment discrimination cases because those who pursue religious vo-
cations are the ones excluded from protection. By excluding clergy
from the protection of anti-discrimination law, government attacks
religion. As long ago as 1978, the Supreme Court recognized that the
government cannot withhold government privileges from the
clergy.168
Although a few cases implicitly apply an equal protection analysis
to religious discrimination, courts rarely deal directly with the issue of
discrimination on the basis of religion.' 69 Instead, claims of discrimi-
nation on the basis of religion typically are recast as free exercise
claims. As a result, the appropriate level of scrutiny for religious dis-
crimination is unclear.
When the Court suggested heightened review in Carolene Products,
it expressly mentioned religious discrimination as triggering strict
scrutiny.'70 Arguably, it should not make much difference whether
the claim is viewed as one of religious discrimination or intrusion on a
free exercise right because both call for strict scrutiny. Historically,
however, free exercise claims have invoked a weakened form of strict
scrutiny.17 Even after the passage of the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act that expressly restored strict scrutiny to free exercise
claims, 7 2 it is unclear whether the standard is the watered-down mea-
sure that permitted most intrusions, or the much sterner strict scru-
167 Some might argue that we only should be concerned about discriminating between
sects, not discriminating between religious and non-religious employees in general. How-
ever, the Supreme Court has held that discrimination against clergy violates the Free Exer-
cise Clause. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (holding that a state could not
prohibit all ministers or priests from holding elective office).
168 Id Although the majority treated the case as a violation of the priest's first amend-
ment right to freely exercise his religion, Justice White characterized the problem as a
fourteenth amendment equal protection violation. Id. at 643 (White, J., concurring).
169 See, e.g., Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam); Fowler v. Rhode Island,
345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) (FrankfurterJ., concurring). See also Alan E. Brownstein, Harmoniz-
ing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and
Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHio ST. L.J. 89, 103 (1990);Jesse H. Choper, Religion and Race
Under the Constitution: Similarities and Differences, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 491 (1994).
170 "Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
[whether] statutes directed at particular religious... minorities may be a special condition
... which may call for a correspondingly more searchingjudicial inquiry." United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n. 4 (1938) (citations omitted).
171 See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718
(1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403
(1963). For a more detailed discussion of free exercise, see part IA1.
172 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
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tiny that is used for racial classifications. 17 Although the Supreme
Court has hinted that religious discrimination triggers heightened
scrutiny,174 it has rejected strict scrutiny when the discrimination oc-
curs in authoritarian settings, such as the army,175 or prisons.176 As a
result, it is unclear what level of scrutiny the Court applies to religious
discrimination. 177
In addition to religious favoritism, the discrimination suits dis-
cussed in this Article involve some other form of bias as well, such as
race, sex, age, or disability discrimination. Although the level of scru-
tiny varies with the group discriminated against,178 such dual discrimi-
nation should not diminish the level of scrutiny. When two forms of
discrimination are intertwined, the plaintiff should be entitled to the
highest appropriate level of scrutiny. The government discriminates
on the basis of religion when it refuses to extend equal protection of
its civil rights laws to employees of religious organizations. Accord-
ingly, courts should apply strict scrutiny in those cases. When apply-
ing this standard to such cases, the state must demonstrate both that it
has a compelling state interest at stake, and that the means are nar-
rowly drawn to achieve that purpose.
2. Employees' Free Exercise of Religion
By authorizing otherwise unlawful discrimination by religious em-
ployers, the government impinges on the employee's free exercise of
religion. The Free Exercise Clause was meant, in part, to protect reli-
173 See, e.g., Frederick M. Gedicks, RFRA and the Possibility ofJustice, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 95
(1995).
174 United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-58 n.4 (1988) (listing dis-
crimination against religious minorities as warranting strict scrutiny); Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate discrimination between de-
nominations on the basis of how they raised funds).
175 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 508 (1986) (upholding the govern-
ment's authority to prohibit soldiers from wearing yarmulkes).
176 See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (holding that religious
discrimination in prison need only bear a reasonable relation to legitimate penological
interests).
177 See, e.g., Brownstein, supra note 85, at 102-12 (arguing that religious minorities with
a history of being the objects of discrimination are precisely the kinds of groups that need
the protection against majoritarian bias that strict scrutiny provides); Lupu, supra note 126,
at 984-89 (suggesting that strict scrutiny is necessary to prevent purposeful prejudice and to
establish the correct balance between government benefits and religious costs).
178 Racial classifications, for example, trigger strict scrutiny. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S.
Ct. 1419, 1485 (1994); City of Richmond v.JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (Rehnquist,
CJ., dissenting) (1989); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 517-18 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91 (1978); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973). In contrast, discrimination against women triggers
intermediate scrutiny, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), while disability discrimina-
tion claims only receive rational basis review. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne living
Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that the circuit court had erred in holding mental
disability to be a quasi-suspect class and applying mid-level scrutiny).
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gious minorities from discrimination. 179 Ironically, religious institu-
tions now seek to use the Free Exercise Clause as a license to
discriminate. Civil rights laws that condone discrimination infringe
the employees' right to freely exercise their religion in three different
ways: (1) the laws discourage individuals from taking religious jobs by
punishing religious employees with the loss of state conferred civil
rights; (2) the laws encourage those excluded to change faiths; and
(3) the laws exclude the viewpoints of disfavored groups from reli-
gious dialogue.
First, minorities, women, the elderly, and the disabled are dis-
couraged from pursuing their faith by becoming religious employees.
A burden is placed on the choice of becoming a minister, priest,
rabbi, or other sectarian employee that is not placed on any non-reli-
gious employees. Such religious employees are forced to forfeit the
government's protection from discrimination. For example, as an Af-
rican-American woman, Reverend Young had a valuable civil right-
the right to be protected from employment discrimination. 0 Reli-
gious employees are the only class excluded from that protection. In
the context of other rights, the court has held that the government
cannot deny state-created civil rights to individuals merely because
they are members of the clergy. In McDaniel v. Paty, the Court held
priests and ministers could not be prohibited from holding elective
office.' 8 ' In finding a Free Exercise Clause violation, the Court ac-
knowledged that clerical status was protected by the First Amend-
ment: "[I] n James Madison's words, the State is 'punishing a religious
profession with the privation of a civil right.' In so doing, Tennessee
'has encroached upon McDaniel's right to the free exercise of
religion.' 8 2
The Court recently reaffirmed the general principle that reli-
gious individuals cannot be denied state-conferred civil rights in Board
of Education of Kityas Joel Village School District v. Grumet.'8 3 "[R] eligious
people (or groups of religious people) cannot be denied the opportu-
nity to exercise the rights of citizens simply because of their religious
affiliations or commitments, for such a disability would violate the
right to religious free exercise .... ,,1184 Legal protection from discrim-
ination is precisely the kind of state-granted right of citizenship that
179 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993);
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understand-
ing of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. Rxv. 1409 (1990).
180 See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
181 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
182 Id. at 626 (citations omitted).
183 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
184 Id. at 2489.
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cannot be denied because of religious employment. Therefore, it vio-
lates the free exercise clause when religious employees are denied the
civil lights protections given other citizens.
Second, permitting religions to discriminate places pressure on
those excluded to change their faith in order to pursue their calling.
Consider, for example, Murphy v. Derwinski.'8 5 Mary Murphy was a
Roman Catholic woman who wanted a government job as a chaplain
at a Veterans Administration (V.A.) hospital.'8 6 To qualify for this
federal job, she was told that she would have to: (1) complete semi-
nary, (2) be ordained in her faith, (3) receive the endorsement of her
church, and (4) pass a V.A. exam.' 8 7 Murphy sued the V.A. claiming
that these criteria discriminated against her on account of her sex
(impact discrimination because the Catholic Church refuses to ordain
women) and violated the First Amendment. 88 The trial judge ac-
knowledged that requiring Catholic women to be ordained in order
to be federally employed chaplains would amount to sex discrimina-
tion, and accordingly invalidated that criteria.'8 9 However, the judge
permitted the V.A. to require Murphy to get the endorsement of the
Catholic Church. 90 Needless to say, Murphy was unable to get the
endorsement. Prior to appeal, the result was that Catholic women
could be excluded from federal jobs unless they gave up their faith to
join a new one like the Episcopal Church that would endorse wo-
men.' 9 ' Creating such an incentive to change one's faith violates both
the free exercise clause and the establishment clause.' 92
Third, denying religious jobs to disfavored groups silences their
religious voices and limits the free exercise rights of those who agree
with them. If minorities, women, the aged, and the disabled become
religious leaders, they may be able to influence the views of the ex-
isting religions. Consequently, they get access to a pulpit to influence
the development of their own faith. Otherwise, their voices and the
voices of those who agree with them go unheard.
185 776 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Colo. 1991), affd, 990 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1993).
186 Id. at 1466.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 1469.
189 Id. at 1470-71.
190 Id. at 1471.
191 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision, but noted in dictum that if
women could not get the endorsement of their church, that provision too could be held
invalid. Murphy v. Derwinski, 990 F.2d 540, 545 (10th Cir. 1993).
192 But see Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that a state could
prohibit the use of peyote in Native American religious ceremonies without violating the
Free Exercise Clause, and thus that the claimants were properly denied unemployment
compensation for work-related misconduct based on such drug use).
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Religious communities define themselves through a continual
process of dialogue. 93 As Nomi Stolzenberg and David Myers ex-
plain: "[T] he self-definition of a community emerges out of a perpet-
ual contest for cultural authority in which the terms of identity are
constantly challenged and revised."' 94 Religions are not static, but
change over time. Excluding African-Americans, women, the aged
and the disabled from religious leadership prevents them from partic-
ipating in the religious experience of helping to define their commu-
nity as it evolves. Therefore, the state impinges on the free exercise of
religion by denying religious employees their civil rights, encouraging
disfavored groups to change faiths, and limiting access to express cer-
tain religious views. However, courts rarely talk about infringing on
the individual's free exercise of religion when a ministerial em-
ployee's job is threatened. Instead, they focus on the churches' free
exercise rights. As a result, federal courts frequently hold that the
First Amendment requires courts to create a judicial exception to the
anti-discrimination statutes for ministerial employees. 95
Courts' emphasis on group or institutional free exercise rights
may be misplaced, however. One well-known First Amendment
scholar, Ira Lupu, argues that free exercise of religion is an individual
rather than a group right.' 96 Individual free exercise rights are consis-
tent with the history of the First Amendment, which traces free exer-
cise rights to "rights of conscience" that must necessarily have been
exercised by individuals. 97 If the Free Exercise Clause primarily pro-
tects individuals, it should be applied to protect the clergy's right to
practice their religion freely without losing their right to be protected
from discrimination. In contrast, other scholars argue that religious
institutions have a collective right of free exercise that would be in-
fringed by applying anti-discrimination laws to churches. In a limited
sense both positions are correct. As Douglas Laycock and Frederick
193 See Stolzenberg, supra note 23.
194 Stolzenberg & Myers, supra note 131, at 633.
195 Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 320 (1994); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian
Hospitals, 736 F. Supp. 1018 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (holding that neither Title VII nor the ADEA
applies to a chaplain's discharge at church-affiliated hospital), aff'd, 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir.
1991); Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir.
1985) (holding that suit brought by woman denied pastoral position in church was barred
by religion clauses of First Amendment), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986).
196 Lupu, supra note 24; Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the
U.S. Constitution, 18 CoNN. L. R.EV. 739 (1986).
197 The dissenting minority at the Pennsylvania Convention in 1787 listed the "inviola-
ble" "right of conscience" as the first item they proposed to change in the Constitution.
The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to Their
Constituents (1787), reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANrI-FEDERAUsT, supra note 107, at 150-51.
See also McConnell, supra note 179 (tracing the development of free exercise provisions in
the colonies and the states).
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Gedicks argue, churches sometimes need group rights; but Ira Lupu
correctly asserts that employment discrimination is the wrong context
for group free exercise rights.' 98
In certain instances, groups can and should have enforceable
constitutional rights, including the right to exercise their religions
freely. However, group rights should only be recognized when two
conditions are met: (1) the group shares common interests and goals,
and (2) the group is used as an intermediary to augment power
against a more powerful group, such as the government.199 In this
vertical context, a religious institution could quite properly defend its
right of free exercise against government intrusion. The Court, for
instance, implicitly has recognized the collective right of the Santeria
to exercise their religion freely,200 and specifically referred to group
free exercise rights in Board of Education of Kityas Joel v. Grumet Village
School District.2 0 ' Such group rights are only appropriate, however, in
vertical contexts. In horizontal disputes in which members of the
group disagree, or insiders and outsiders disagree, group rights un-
fairly bias the decision in favor of the more powerful and the status
quo.2 0 2 Discrimination suits are necessarily horizontal. These dis-
putes only arise when an individual claims that the group is either
excluding or exploiting him. The group does not need aggregate
power to defend itself. It is the subordinated individual who needs to
maximize his power. In these cases, only individual rights should
count.
This distinction between horizontal and vertical disputes limits
when the government should become involved in disputes with reli-
198 See Laycock, supra note 24; Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutionaljurispru-
dence of Relgious Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 99.
199 See TUSHNET, supra note 23, at 272-73 (describing how churches can be seen as
defense alliances, forming private preferences that affect public policy, and creating an
experience of solidarity);Jane Rutherford, Beyond Individual Privacy: A New Theory of Family
Rights, 39 U. FL.A. L. REv. 627, 643-51 (1987) (distinguishing between group rights in verti-
cal contexts and individual rights in horizontal contexts and arguing that families have
group rights when they act in unison to resist government interference). Tushnet argues
that religious institutions operate as "impenetrable black boxes" within which private pref-
erences are formed which affect public policy, but which cannot be the object of that
policy. TusHNEtr, supra note 23, at 272-73.
200 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
201 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2489 (1994) ("[R]eligious people (or groups of religious people)
cannot be denied the opportunity to exercise the rights of citizens simply because of their
religious affiliations or commitments, for such a disability would violate the right to reli-
gious free exercise .... ").
202 For a critique of choosing sides by refusing to resolve the dispute in the property
context, see Patty Gerstenblith, Civil Court Resolution of Property Disputes Among Religious Or-
ganizations, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 513, 527 (1990). For the leading case holding that courts
should refuse to hear property disputes among church members, see Serbian Eastern Or-
thodox Diocese for the United States and Canada v. Milovojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 698
(1976).
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gious employers. The government should not exercise its own initia-
tive to create vertical disputes. The state should only intervene when
an individual seeks help by, say, filing a complaint with a court or the
E.E.O.C. If the discriminatory views are so intrinsic to the faith that
no member can even conceive of the faith without the discrimination,
then it is unlikely that anyone will complain and consequently no hor-
izontal dispute will develop. The issue arises only when members of
the faith complain.
The government should not go out spoiling for a fight. Hence, it
may be problematic when the Internal Revenue Services targets cer-
tain religions for their discriminatory practices.203 Challenges to dis-
crimination can come from two different sources: individual plaintiffs,
and administrative agencies like the I.R.S. or the E.E.O.C.. Individu-
als complain about all different kinds of religious institutions,204 while
government agencies seem to target religious groups outside the
mainstream.205 When these less-favored religions litigate the issue,
they generally lose,206 but when more powerful mainstream faiths liti-
gate similar issues, they generally win.2 0 7 When the government inter-
venes directly and on its own initiative, it tends to confer a
disproportionate amount of power on religious enterprises in a verti-
cal context. Such intervention also seems to target disfavored reli-
203 See infra note 205-06 and accompanying text.
204 See, e.g., Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir.
1991) (Episcopal woman priest complained of sex and age discrimination); Little v. Wuerl,
929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991) (Protestant teacher complained when a Catholic school did
not rehire her because she remarried without complying with Catholic canonical law);
Murphy v. Derwinski, 776 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Col. 1991), affTd, 990 F.2d 540 (1998) (Catho-
lic woman complained that the VA required her to be an ordained priest and obtain
church approval to be a VA chaplain); Dolter v. Wahlert High School, 483 F. Supp. 266
(N.D. Iowa 1980) (Catholic woman complained of sex discrimination when she was fired
by a Catholic school for being single and pregnant).
205 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (I.R.S. sued funda-
mentalist Christian university for back taxes after revoking tax-exempt status because of its
policy of racial discrimination); E.E.O.C. v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n., 482 F. Supp.
1291 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982) (E.E.O.C. prosecuted several
actions against the publishing company affiliated with the Seventh Day Adventists because
of sex discrimination in pay).
206 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574 (I.R.S. permitted to revoke tax-exempt status
from religious educational institutions that racially discriminate); Pacfic Press Publishing
Ass'n, 482 F. Supp. 1291 (ruling for E.E.O.C. in a suit against the publishing company
affiliated with the Seventh-Day Adventists because of sex discrimination in pay).
207 See, e.g., Wuer4 929 F.2d 944 (permitting Catholic school not to rehire a Protestant
teacher because she remarried without complying with Catholic canonical law); Scharon,
929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991) (permitting Protestant hospital to fire an older woman on the
grounds that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Title VII would require the
court to become excessively entangled in religious matters); Murphy, 776 F. Supp. 1466
(requiring VA to remove its ordination requirement, but allowing VA to continue to
require endorsement from the Catholic church before hiring chaplains even though the
church refuses to ordain women). But seeDoewr, 483 F. Supp. 266 (holding that application
of Title VII would not result in excessive entanglement).
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gions. Therefore, the First Amendment's religious liberty clauses can
be used as a shield against vertical interference from the government.
We have less to fear from government when it acts in a horizontal
context to resolve individually initiated claims of discrimination. The
government cannot target unpopular faiths because the individual,
not the state, chooses the defendant. Moreover, the state authority is
used to help balance power between the individual and the religious
group. Hence, when the free exercise rights of individuals are at stake
in a horizontal dispute, the government should resolve the dispute.
In summary, then, individual free exercise rights are jeopardized
when the government excludes religious employees from protections
it offers to other employees. Such exclusion places an unwarranted
burden on individuals' choice to take religious jobs; and may en-
courage those who choose a religious vocation to change faiths. It
also excludes some religious views from internal religious dialogues.
Refusing to decide these bias complaints resolves the disputes in favor
of the discriminating employer and thereby threatens the individual's
free exercise rights.
3. Employees' Rights to Participate & Speak
Permitting religious employers to discriminate on the basis of
race, sex, age, and disability imbeds such prejudice in American cul-
ture. Religion permeates our lives both publicly and privately. It is
precisely because religion is central that we should be concerned
about who has access to religious leadership.208 Religion is crucial on
three different levels: personal or spiritual, communal, and public.
On the personal level religion provides spirituality. For many,
spirituality is the single most important part of their lives. For those
who believe, spirituality may take precedence over all secular matters.
This concern for faith may have motivated the strong stance in favor
of freedom of "conscience" espoused by the anti-federalists. 20 9 Also
on the personal level, religion provides a crucial source of identity,
constituting an important part of who we are, as well as who we are
not. Because religion is an important source of identity, the absence
of religion is in itself a crucial marker. Hence, religion or its absence
helps to define all of us, whether we view ourselves as religious or
purely secular. To exclude minorities from religions is to define them
208 Stephen Carter argues that American law already trivializes religion. See generally
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAw AND POLITIcs TRIVIAL-
IZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
209 For example, the dissenting minority at the Pennsylvania Convention in 1787 listed
the "inviolable" "right of conscience" as the first item they proposed to change in the
Constitution. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Penn-
sylvania to Their Constituents, supra note 197, at 150-51. See also McConnell, supra note 179.
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as "others" unlike ourselves and set up the basis for discrimination
throughout society.
The conflict between the religion clauses of the First Amendment
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
flects different experiences of religion.2 10 For some, religion offers
moral authority, peace, community, and most importantly, spiritually
transformative experiences. For others, religion is perceived as au-
thoritarian and oppressive.211 For individuals like Reverend Young,
members of the clergy who have been victims of prejudice, religion
offers both spiritual transformation and oppression.
Religion, however, is not merely personal. It plays an important
communal role. It provides a community of shared values, concerns,
and culture that, for many, serves as an anchor in a fragmented soci-
ety. It even affects how we form, define, and dissolve families. Hence,
communitarians who look for alternatives to purely individual rights
often turn to religion.2 12 Religion plays a more practical communal
role as well by providing the social services that government depends
upon. Religious groups, for instance, provide care for the elderly,
adoption services, foster home placements, and orphanages under
government contracts. Therefore, religion is important as a commu-
nity organization both as a source of cultural identity and as a source
of services. Excluding disfavored groups from religions also circum-
scribes their role in the larger community.
Finally, religion functions on a public level both as a source of
morality and as an intermediary between individuals and the state.
Accordingly, some of the Founders, civic republicans in particular,
thought that religion could supply the public virtue necessary to gov-
ern a republic.2 13 DeTocqueville recognized the role of such public
virtue when he described American religion as "the first of their polit-
ical institutions. '214 However, religion plays a more overt political
role as well. Religious groups often become directly or indirectly in-
volved in the moral issues that dominate public debate.
210 See Durham & Dushku, supra note 44, at 438-40.
211 See id. See generally Becker, supra note 36 (arguing that religion has contributed to
women's subordinate status in society); and DALY, supra note 15 (arguing that religion
oppresses women).
212 See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 23, at 274.
213 See generally Timothy L. Hall, Religion and Civic Wrtue: A Justification of Free Exercis 67
TUL. L. REv. 87 (1992) (arguing for a robust concept of religious liberty based on its role in
nurturing civic virtue).
214 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACA IN AMERICA 153 (George Lawrence trans., 2d
ed. 1990).
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Religions are key political players. They have long been influen-
tial on the most important political concerns 21 5 from abolition,216 to
desegregation,2 17 to abortion.218 Religious organizations not only
take stands on important issues, they also often become involved in
politics directly. Clergy members have run for and held political of-
fice,219 and conservative Christian groups have taken control of sev-
eral state Republican Party organizations. 220 Consequently, religious
groups are sources of political power and influence.
Religion is involved in politics in more subtle ways as well, often
influencing the way political decision makers act. Citizens casting
votes, judges rendering decisions, and legislators creating statutes are
all influenced by their religions.22' Hence, those who shape religious
215 "'[C]hurch and religious groups in the United States have long exerted powerful
political pressures on state and national legislatures, on subjects as diverse as slavery, war,
gambling, drinking, prostitution, marriage, and education.'" McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S.
618, 641 (1978) (Brennan,J., concurring) (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW, § 14-12, at 866-867 (1978)); see also KARST, supra note 38, at 34 (discussing
the long tradition of churches fostering political change, including abolition, reconstruc-
tion, and the civil rights movement); Brownstein, supra note 85, at 96 ("Religion contrib-
utes immensely to the moral tone of political debate and operates as an important political
power base in society.").
216 Religion was used to both attack and support slavery. See generally FORREST G.
WOOD, THE ARROGANCE OF FAmTH: CHRISTIANITY AND RACE IN AMERICA FROM THE COLONIAL
ERA TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1990) (arguing that fundamentalist Christians used
scripture to support the institution of slavery); CREEL, supra note 4 (discussing religion in
relation to the slavery system); WILLS, supra note 13, at 195-206 (discussing slave owners'
fear of introducing Christianity to slaves and the use of Christianity by African-Americans
in their struggles for equality).
217 Martin Luther King Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. 290 (1986).
218 See Becker, supra note 36; WILs, supra note 13, at 305-37; see also In re United States
Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020 (1989) (involving pro-choice groups' claims that the
Catholic Church's tax-exempt status should be revoked because of its heavy involvement in
campaigning for pro-life candidates and legislation), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 918 (1990). The
case was dismissed for lack of standing to raise the claim. Id. at 1031.
219 Arlene Violet, a Republican and former nun, was the first woman elected Attorney
General in Rhode Island. Georgia Dullea, Women in 1984: Steps Forward and Back, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 1984, at 18. Father Drinan, a Roman Catholic priest, was elected to the
House of Representatives. Information Bank Abstracts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1970, at 40. See
also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1977) (involving a Baptist minister who served as a
delegate to the Tennessee constitutional convention).
220 Richard L. Berke, Religious Right Gains Influence and Spreads Discord in G.O.P., N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 1994, at Al.
221 See CARTER, supra note 208, at 67; see also MICHAELJ. PERRY, LoVE AND POWER: THE
ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991); Stephen L. Carter, The
Religiously DevoutJudge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV 932 (1989); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Con-
victions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REv. 352 (1985); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions
and Political Choice: Some Further Thoughts, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 1019 (1990); Sanford Levin-
son, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39
DEPAUL L. Rxv. 1047 (1990); Frederick Schauer, May Officials Think Religiously, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1075 (1986); Ruti Teitel, A Critique of Religion as Politics in the Public Sphere, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 747 (1993).
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views have a form of political power as well. This dual power reflects
the fact that religion and politics are overlapping spheres. Religions
are affected by the values of the polity.222 Similarly, the political com-
munity is influenced by the values of the religious communities. In-
deed, one way to view religions is to see them as intermediary political
institutions that enable their members to organize for political change
in favor of their shared moral views. 223 That is quite close to James
Madison's view of religions as factions.224 It is also consistent with
civic republican notions of religions as institutions that can help good
citizens define the virtue necessary for republican government.225
Religions are conduits for communication between individuals
and the state.226 Therefore, when religions exclude certain groups
from religious leadership, they exclude them not only from religious
participation, but also from access to an organizational structure that
is part of the political community. Access to such intermediate orga-
nizations is particularly important for minorities, women, and the dis-
abled-groups that tend to have less political power than their
numbers would suggest.22 7 Several successful African-American lead-
ers like Dr. Martin Luther King andJesseJackson first gained access to
the public as religious leaders. Forcing excluded groups to form their
own religions to gain such political access and power intrudes on their
free exercise rights. It is ludicrous to suggest that Reverend Young
222 Barbara B. Zikmund, Winning Ordination For Women in Mainstream Protestant
Churches, in 3 WOMEN AND RELIGION IN AMERicA 339, 347 (Rosemary R. Ruether & Rose-
mary S. Keller eds.) ("In 1920, the women's suffrage amendment was ratified and women
became voting citizens. Church women began to wonder, If [sic] women can go to the
polls to vote for the president and congress, why can't we vote and serve as leaders in our
churches?").
223 See, e.g., Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (noting that the
Jaycees, like some churches, have a right of expressive association to help preserve cultural
and political diversity). See also TusHNEr, supra note 23, at 248 ("Religion ... is a form of
social life that mobilizes the deepest passions of believers in the course of creating institu-
tions that stand between individuals and the state.").
224 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
225 See, e.g., DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 214, at 150. See generally Hall, supra note 213
(arguing for a robust concept of religious liberty based on its role in nurturing civic
virtue).
226 See ARLiN M. ADAMs & CHARLs J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS
IaBERTY 50-51 (1990).
227 In 1993 the United States Senate had only one African-American senator and six
women senators. Similarly, only 8.7% of the representatives were black and 10.8% were
women. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 443 (113th ed. 1993). See also STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE PoL-ncs OF
IbGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POIrTICAL CHANGE 207-08 (1974):
[S]ince symbolic uses of politics induce quiescence and thwart organiza-
tion, many interests necessarily go unrepresented in the bargaining pro-
cess. The political arena in which the material rewards of politics are
distributed does not, in other words, reflect anything like the full range of
legitimate interests. It is not, as the pluralists tend to argue, a microcosm of
the American society.
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should just abandon her membership in the United Methodist church
in order to have her views heard. No one should be forced to choose
between political access and spiritual fulfillment.
Even if the excluded individuals are willing to form religions of
their own, the newly formed religious groups are far less likely to have
the same access to political power and funds that the more established
religions have.228 Indeed, faiths are not equally powerful.229 Their
power varies greatly with their overall numbers, their concentrations
within a given community, and their resources. 230 It takes years, if not
generations, to develop power and connections. 23'
If religions are viewed as organizing structures that can provide
access to political and financial resources, then they become much
more like private dubs, which are not permitted to discriminate. 23 2
As Laurence Tribe explains it: "[T]he more the association affects the
public realm and access to the privileges and opportunities available
in that realm-the greater the state's power to regulate an organiza-
tion's exclusionary practices." 233 Pulpits provide a soapbox from
which people can influence political decisions. When women, minori-
ties, the aged, and the disabled are excluded from pulpits, they lose
important rights of religious and political free speech. Once again,
the framers may have seen connections that have become obscure to
us after years of analyzing the Constitution one clause at a time. The
anti-federalists who drafted the First Amendment combined free
228 One study of religious beliefs and practices in Muncie, Indiana, from 1924 to 1978,
found that families contributed 3.3% of their income to churches. Gedicks, supra note
198, at 100 n.3. If funding corresponds to the wealth of the congregants, then we would
expect churches comprised solely of women or African-Americans to be less well funded
than others. In 1993, for example, the median income for women working full-time was
77% of the earnings of their male counterparts. Also measured for 1993, the median in-
come for white women was $408, $352 for black women, and $315 for Hispanic women.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT No. 865, EMPLOYMENT IN PER-
SPECTVE: WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE I (4th quarter 1993).
229 Brownstein, supra note 85, at 107 (discussing the varied political power of different
sects).
230 See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 23, at 255-56 (discussing how the power of religions
varies not only with their numbers, but with their concentrations within particular commu-
nities); Brownstein, supra note 85, at 99 n.42 (correlating religious political power with the
size of the denomination).
231 Cf. WILLIAM GOLDMAN, THE SEASON: A CANDID LOOK AT BROADWAY 223 (1969).
Goldman describes a play by Carl Reiner called Something Different. In the play a character
claims that his mother is a famous religious leader. A skeptic suggests that he has never
heard of her. The claimant replies: "Give the old lady a chance; if she don't make it in
1,500 years, then start hollering fake." I am indebted to Timothy O'Neill who pointed out
that even comics like Carl Reiner recognize that it takes a long time to establish religions.
232 Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 547
(1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Lupu, supra note 24.
233 TRIBE, supra note 59, § 16-15, at 1480 n. 37.
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speech and religion in a single sentence. Modem scholars have also
suggested that free exercise of religion protects freedom of speech.2 34
When minorities, women, the aged, and the disabled are ex-
cluded from church leadership, they pay a heavy price: the loss of
access to powerful financial and political institutions as well as the
power to influence their own religions. Excluding disfavored groups
from church leadership effectively chills their religious and political
voices. Because religious and political communities overlap, it is no
solution to exile minorities. They must be given a chance to be heard
in both communities. Otherwise, they are denied freedom of reli-
gious and political participation as well as speech.
C. The Countervailing Interests of Religious Employers As
Justifications for Unlawful Discrimination
Religious employers justify otherwise illegal discrimination with
three different rationales. First, religion proclaims itself as an in-
tensely personal area of conscience, a private realm where the state
has little interest in intruding. Second, religious institutions assert
that if they are compelled not to discriminate, they can be forced to
associate with those they would rather exclude. Under this theory, the
excluded individuals should form their own religious institutions.
Third, because religious entities get greater protection than others
under the First Amendment, religious groups claim that anti-discrimi-
nation laws intrude on free exercise rights and entangle government
in church affairs.
1. The Public-Private Dichotomy as a Justification for Discrimination
Religious institutions are private, not public entities. Therefore,
religions may claim that they are not part of the larger "worldly" enter-
prise to which government regulation is appropriate. Consequently,
some might argue that discrimination in this sphere is purely private,
allegedly beyond the scope or interest of public law. This argument
rests not so much on the claim that these institutions are religious, but
rather on the claim that they are private self-contained entities. The
234 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 59, § 14-6, at 1186; Brownstein, supra note 85, at 112-25;
Stephen Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendmen 52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 75, 148-49 (1990); William P.
Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 Mn, a. L. Rnv. 545,
566-72 (1983) (arguing that most free exercise claims can be subsumed within free
speech); Marshall, supra note 124, at 244 (arguing that one of the important justifications
for the religion clauses is that like the freedom of speech, they protect the search for
"truth").
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Court has held that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit
purely private discrimination.2 5
One way-to separate the private from the public sphere is to dis-
tinguish between internal and external matters. The former are pri-
vate, while the latter are public and more subject to regulation.
Accordingly, some of the cases involving discriminatory religious em-
ployers distinguish between instances in which the institution is acting
in its religious capacity as opposed to its more business-like opera-
tions.236 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act makes a similar distinction in
its exception for religious discrimination. 23 7 However, other cases
hold that religious employers have carte blanche to discriminate in em-
ployment decisions. Hence, arguably, church employment issues are
purely private matters that do not concern the state or its public
interest.238
This approach seems appealing because it creates a specific rule
that helps government and religious institutions to recognize what
concerns are subject to public regulation. Although not expressly
based on the First Amendment notions of separation of church and
state, this public-private distinction serves some of the same purposes.
If the private institutional realm and the public governmental realm
are carefully defined, then conflict is minimized.23 9 When religious
235 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding that a private club that
held a state liquor license could privately discriminate); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883).
236 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (holding that an employee of a public, non-profit
facility operating by the church could be discharged for failing to qualify for certification
from the church as a member); Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that
Catholic school may decide not to renew non-Catholic teacher's contract due to her remar-
riage because Title VII did not apply to school's decision); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal
Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that neither Title VII nor
ADEA applied to chaplain's discharge by church-affiliated hospital); Rayburn v. General
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that a
woman denied a pastoral position by a church could not sue under Title VII for race or sex
discrimination), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986); DeMa'rco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 797 F.
Supp. 1142 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd, 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that lay teacher
whose duty included leading students in prayer was not protected under ADEA); Cochran
v. St. Louis Preparatory Seminary, 717 F. Supp. 1413 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (holding that dismis-
sal of seminary employee was not covered by ADEA); Carter v. Baltimore Annual Confer-
ence, CIV. A. No. 86-2543 SSH., 1987 WL 18470 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that court review
of the dismissal of an ordained minister would interfere with free exercise of religion). See
also Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation ofDiscrimina-
tion by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1514 (1979).
237 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 provides that Title VII "shall not apply to... a religious corpo-
ration, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such
corporation, association, educational institution, or society or its activities."
238 See Laycock, supra note 24, at 1376.
239 Scholars have suggested that one of the purposes of the religion clauses is to pre-
vent conflict. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 124, at 246-47 (noting that "lessening divisive-
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employers discriminate, arguably no state action occurs. What hap-
pens in the private realm of religion is beyond state concern.
The public-private distinction has two major flaws, however. First,
some of the most invidious discrimination to occur in the United
States has been private. Slavery was a private institution. As Jacobus
tenBroek argued, the government's failure to protect African-Ameri-
cans from the private institution of slavery was a core problem to be
addressed by the Fourteenth Amendment.240 Indeed, tenBroek ar-
gued that the Fourteenth Amendment, properly interpreted, requires
the government to protect individuals from private discrimination:
"The equal protection of the laws is violated fully as much, perhaps
even more, by private invasions made possible through failure of gov-
ernment to act as by discriminatory laws and officials." 241 Even some
of the Founding Fathers were concerned with protecting individuals
from private depredations. As James Madison expressed it: "It is of
great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against
the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society
against the injustice of the other part."242 Although the Supreme
Court has not agreed that government restrictions on private discrimi-
nation are constitutionally compelled, it has sustained Congressional
efforts to dismantle private discrimination as valid exercises of federal
authority.243 As a result, many of the statutory provisions prohibiting
ness" is one of the values served by the Establishment Clause); Michael E. Smith, The Special
Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 83, 95-98 (arguing that the religion
clauses are justified, in part, by the fear of social strife).
240 JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 97-
98 (1951).
241 Id at 97. For a similar argument that constitutional values should be protected
from private incursions, see generally, Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 503 (1985) (arguing that inexcusable violations of fundamental values should
not be tolerated simply because the actor is private); Robin West, Toward an Abolitionist
Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendmen4 94W. VA. L. REv. 111, 129 (1991) (arguing that
equal protection of laws should be interpreted to mean that each person is protected from
all violence and violation, state and non-state). Others have argued for dispensing with the
requirement of state action. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., "State Action, " Equal Protection,
and California's Proposition 14,81 HARv. L. REV. 69 (1967); Harold W. Horowitz, The Mislead-
ing Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendmen4 30 S. Cal. L. Rev. 208 (1957);
Harold W. Horowitz & Kenneth L. Karst, The Proposition Fourteen Cases:Justice in Search of a
Justification, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 37 (1966); Kenneth Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, Reitman
v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 39 (1967).
242 THE FEDERAUST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Of
course, Madison probably meant that it was necessary to protect property owners from the
masses of the more impoverished. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison)
(arguing that pure democracy is incompatible with personal security or property rights).
See also NEDELSKY, supra note 50 (arguing that the Framers formed a government designed
chiefly to protect elites and private property); Rutherford, supra note 38 (discussing the
protection of property from Robin Hood to the Magna Carte).
243 See generallyJones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (holding that Con-
gress has the power to prohibit private discrimination in house sales). In Jones, however,
the Court based its holding on the Congressional power to implement the 13th amend-
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discrimination are aimed at private actions. 24 The civil rights statutes
reflect the principle that victims deserve to be protected from discrim-
ination, regardless of its source.245 Other private employers are
bound to follow laws prohibiting employment discrimination. Reli-
gious employers should be held accountable to the same standards.246
The public-private distinction has a second flaw; it assumes that
no state action is involved when religious institutions discriminate.
However, as previously discussed, the government statutorily discrimi-
nates against religious individuals, and judicially discriminates against
other disfavored groups, by denying them a generally available state
benefit protection from discrimination.247 These state actions are in-
corporated both in statutes and court decisions that fall within the
traditional realm of state action. 248
2. The Right to Freely Associate as aJustification for Discrimination
The second rationale for exempting religious entities from civil
rights statutes focuses on the right of free association. The right to
associate implies the right to choose not to associate. 249 Theoretically,
if religious organizations are compelled not to discriminate, members
can be forced to associate with people they would rather exclude. In-
deed, unless the state permits religions to choose their own clergy, it
risks "forced community."250 Arguably each individual is free to go
her own way religiously. If one faith discriminates, find another. If
they all discriminate, create your own. This thesis assumes that" indi-
viduals can be forced out of their faiths with little or no harm to either
the individual or the community. That view rests on two assumptions:
ment, which was specifically directed at private activity. Congress arguably has power to
regulate private discriminatory action under its Commerce Clause powers as well; Matt
Pawa, Comment, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can Congress Save Us?
An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 141 U. PA. L Rv. 1029 (1993)
(arguing that Congress has the power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact
legislation to expand rights that the Supreme Court has held not to be constitutionally
mandated). See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding
that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to prohibit discrimination in public
accommodations).
244 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII; Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e1-2000e17
(1994); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994); Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000e (k) (1994); TENBROEK, supra note 240, at 97.
245 TENBROEK, supra note 240.
246 See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (holding that individuals practicing their religions are not entitled to exemptions
from neutral generally applicable laws).
247 See supra part II.A.
248 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that court approval of private
discrimination amounts to state action).
249 TRIBE, supra note 59, § 15-17.
250 Frances Olsen coined the phrase "forced community." Frances Olsen, Statutory
Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx. L. RF,. 387, 393 (1984).
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(1) that faith is a matter of individual choice, rather than accultura-
tion and community; and (2) that religious and political power are
independent.
Much of our religious jurisprudence assumes that religion is sim-
ply a matter of personal preference that can be changed easily.251
However, religion is not necessarily a voluntary association. As Susan
and David Williams have so persuasively argued, for many individuals
and sects, religion is not entirely chosen.252 Many faiths establish
membership by birth as well as conversion. For example, a person is
Jewish if his or her mother is Jewish, although others can convert to
Judaism. In this sense, being Jewish is like being a member of a fam-
ily. It is generally created by birth, but members can be adopted.253
Like a family, merely abandoning the faith does not sever the connec-
tion: "even Jews who rebel against the faith and discard its religious
beliefs and practices are still regarded as Jews . -254 For example,
Russian emigres who are the children of Jews are considered Jewish
even though they know nothing at all about the nature of the Jewish
religion because of the suppression of Judaism in their homeland.
Similarly, other faiths are not purely voluntary. For example, some
view themselves as part of an uncontrollable divine order,255 while
others adopt non-volitional doctrines such as predestination 256 or di-
vine grace. 257 Therefore, religion is only partly chosen.
The notion of voluntarism derives from a liberal tradition that
protects religion as an element of autonomy-the right to choose a
faith. According to one prominent communitarian scholar, respect is
accorded not to religious conviction, but rather to the individual
251 "Fundamental to the conception of religious liberty protected by the Religion
Clause is the idea that religious beliefs are a matter of voluntary choice by individuals and
their associations, and that each sect is entitled to 'flourish according to the zeal of its
adherents and the appeal of its dogma.'" McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 640 (1978)
(Brennan, J. concurring) (footnote omitted) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
313 (1952)).
252 Williams & Williams, supra note 10.
253 HAYIM HALEvY DONIN, To BE AJEW: A GUIDE TOJEWISH OBSERVANCE IN CONTEMPO.
RARY LIFE 8 (1972).
254 Id. at 9.
255 Williams & Williams, supra note 10, at 794 (Native Americans believe that their
existence is not separable from their religion, which is not separable from the natural
world).
256 Id. at 859 (Calvinists proclaim free will a fiction while adhering to the doctrine of
predestination, a nonvolitionalist doctrine).
257 Id. at 861 (The vast majority of early settlers, such as the New England Puritans,
adhered to the notions that human beings are unable to achieve salvation without the
assistance of divine grace and that God may grant grace for God's own reasons, regardless
of human behavior).
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choice to be religious or not 2 58 That view has been criticized as not
sufficiently protective of religious duties.259
Even those who believe that religion is purely a matter of per-
sonal faith may be harmed by forced exclusion from their community.
As previously noted, religion is a crucial part of how individuals define
themselves.2 60 Religion looms even larger for those who pursue for-
mal education for the clergy. To suggest that minorities, women, the
disabled, and the aged leave to form their own church is not a viable
option. Indeed, this kind of separatism is reminiscent of the separate
but equal rationale of Plessy v. Ferguson.261
To understand why leaving the faith is not an appropriate option,
picture the plight of a thirteen-year-old girl who has been raised as a
Roman Catholic since birth, but is bothered by some of the church
doctrines. After years of study, confession, and frequent prayer, the
girl is preparing for her confirmation in her faith. In sincere tones,
the girl consistently questions her religious teachers on the rationale
for excluding women from the priesthood. Her final report card
from religion class contains glowing reports of her knowledge, com-
mitment, and faith, but concludes with the statement: "Molly contin-
ues to have problems with the patriarchal structure of the church.
Perhaps she would be more comfortable in another faith." Although
not necessarily malicious, the statement may make Molly feel unwel-
come. Because Molly is immersed in a Roman Catholic culture, to
leave the church is to be isolated from her friends, her school, and
her family. The message silences Molly in two very damaging ways.
First, it teaches her to be quiet, to keep her innermost questions to
herself. Second, it teaches Molly to abandon any attempt to form her
own interpretation of her religion. If she remains in the church, she
is silenced. If she leaves, she is exiled.
Molly's views of the role of women are not accidental. Just as she
learned her faith from her religious culture, she learned her feminism
from a modern American culture that celebrates the strength, inde-
pendence, and equality of women. Imagine Molly's sense of betrayal
and fear when she reads her report card. She is punished for thinking
for herself, for expressing her views, and for her self-awareness as a
religious female. She feels forced to choose between her view of her-
258 Michael J. Sandel, Reliious Liberty-Freedom of Conscence or Freedom of Choice, 1989
UTAH L REV. 597.
259 See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text; see also Sandel, supra note 258; Wil-
liams & Williams, supra note 10.
260 See, e.g., KARsr, supra note 38, at 21 ("Religions... use ritual to etch beliefs into the
individual psyche.... The individual's identification with cultural groups... plays a major
part in the process of self-definition."); PERRY, supra note 133, at 60 ("[A] person is partly
constituted by her moral convictions and commitments.").
261 163 U.S. 537 (1896) overruled by, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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self as a female and her religion. Whatever the choice, she will feel
fragmented and hurt. Molly is a casualty of the conflict between her
religious culture and the larger American culture.
Although Molly is in the process of forming her own views, they
are not voluntarily chosen.2 62 Molly did not actually choose to be bap-
tized as a baby,2 63 receive first communion as a seven-year-old, or at-
tend parochial schools. Molly was born and raised in a religious
community.2 64 It is disingenuous to suggest that Molly can simply
choose to leave or form her own church. Molly's stake in the church
only grows as she moves toward a religious vocation.
More than mere personal isolation is at risk if Molly is forced out
of the church. She is denied the opportunity to practice her faith.
Her Roman Catholic religion teaches her a sacramental tradition not
available in other religions. Forcing her to leave suggests that she
does not need a spiritual life. The individual's free exercise of reli-
gion is at stake when she is excluded.2 65 Indeed, if religion is an in-
herent part of how an individual defines herself, exclusion from the
religion causes the individual to lose a part of herself.2 66 For example,
consider the practice of shunning in the Amish community. As the
Court in Yoder recognized, such religions are deeply imbedded ways of
262 For a discussion of voluntarism see Williams & Williams, supra note 10.
263 Infant baptism is a good example of the nonvoluntaristic nature of some religions.
Babies do not have the cognitive powers to choose the faith for themselves. Instead, the
sacrament of infant baptism reflects the view that God chooses to grant divine grace on the
child. Nevertheless, baptism continues to be the measure of membership in many Chris-
dan denominations.
264 For a discussion of the role religion plays in forming the community, see TUSHNET,
supra note 23, at 247-76.
265 Hence, I would disagree with Stephen Carter's view that the decision to ordain
women priests is solely an internal church decision that has nothing to do with women's
rights. CARTER, supra note 208, at 75-80. Women within the church are both women and
members of the faith. Forcing women to divide themselves over these issues violates both
free exercise and equal protection principles. These questions matter precisely because I
do not trivialize the importance of religious devotion.
266 See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Reltgious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse,
140 U. PA. L. REv. 149, 202-04 (1991) (discussing the "personal autonomy rationale," which
contends that religion is inherent to an individual's self-definition); KAksr, supra note 38,
at 21. See alsoAUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER 114 (1984) ("For in order to survive, those of
us for whom oppression is as american as apple pie have always had to be watchers, to
become familiar with the language and manners of the oppressor, even sometimes adopt-
ing them for some illusion of protection."). See generally Martha Minow, Identities, 3 YA IEJ.
L. & HuMAN. 97 (1991) (arguing that relatively powerless groups frequently must adjust
their sense of self to outside expectations).
[Vol. 81:1049
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS
life.267 To be shunned by such a community is truly to be a different
person.2 68
The dispute over discrimination by religious employers may be
characterized as a free association claim, a free exercise claim,269 or an
establishment claim.270 Whatever the label, the state cannot presume
that one subgroup within the religion automatically wins.2 71 The
question remains as to who gets to define the terms of association.
That question cannot be answered by blithely assuming that faith is
purely voluntary. Individuals are not completely free to leave at will.
Faith is defined in both voluntary and involuntary ways in the context
of a culture and a community.
Like other rights, the right of free association is not unlimited.
All anti-discrimination measures limit the right of free association.
Although individuals may exclude disfavored groups when then they
choose their friends and form their families, in more public settings
like the job market, the state can require disfavored groups to be in-
cluded. The larger, more public, less selective, and more political an
organization is, the less right it has to discriminate in membership; 272
the Supreme Court cited these criteria when it ruled that the Jaycees
could not rely on the right of free association to exclude women. 273
Although religions vary in size, they tend to be open to the public,
and often even proselytize for new members. More importantly, reli-
gions provide key political access. 274 Hence, religious institutions that
provide political access resemble the Jaycees which are formed to sup-
port public interests, more than they resemble families or other
purely private groups that are permitted to discriminate. Therefore,
the right to associate cannot protect religious employers that
discriminate.
267 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972) ("[R] eligion is not simply a matter of
theocratic belief.... [T]he Old Order Amish religion pervades and determines virtually
their entire way of life, regulating it with the detail of the Talmudic diet through the
strictly enforced rules of the church community.").
268 For an excellent discussion of the practice of shunning and its legal ramifications,
see Justin K. Miller, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: Religious Shunning and the Free
Exercise Clause, 137 U. PA. L. Rav. 271 (1988).
269 See infra notes 312-16 and accompanying text.
270 See infra notes 309-11 and accompanying text.
271 For a critique of choosing sides by refusing to resolve the dispute in the property
context, see Gerstenblith, supra note 202, at 527. For the leading case holding that courts
should refuse to hear property disputes among church members, see Serbian Eastern Or-
thodox Diocese for the United States and Canada v. Milovojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), cert.
denied, 443 U.S. 904 (1979).
272 Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621 (1984).
273 Id. at 620.
274 For a fuller discussion, see supra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
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3. The Fear of Governmentally Controlled Religion as a Justification
for Discrimination
Forcing religions to avoid such discrimination arguably infringes
the free exercise of discriminatory religion.275 Theoretically, if gov-
ernment can control who churches hire, it can control the nature of
the religion itself.2 76 Persistent examples of government religious per-
secution caution us to be wary about granting the government too
much power to interfere with faith.2 77
The religious community might argue that only they can decide
what leaders to "tolerate." There are, however, limits to tolerance, 278
and different religions draw the limits in different places: the dis-
abled, elderly, women, or minority clergy. Religious employers should
not be forced to be tolerant because to "tolerate" is to "collude."279
However, just as there are limits to religious tolerance, there are limits
to state tolerance as well. If to tolerate is to collude, must the state
collude in exclusions based on race, gender, disability, or age? Must
the state tolerate discrimination? In every other context, the answer is
no. The state has a compelling state interest in eradicating discrimi-
nation. What, then, is so special about religious freedoms that reli-
gious employers are permitted to exceed the limits of tolerance set for
all others?
One reason to tolerate discrimination by religious employers is
that some individuals fear government intrusion into religion more
than they fear discrimination.280 That greater fear may reflect a
majoritarian bias. Those who have a vested interest in religion may
275 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 24 (arguing that the right to discriminate in hiring is
encompassed within a group right of free exercise).
276 See Bagni, supra note 24, at 1540 ("[A] congregation must be accorded the right to
discriminate-racially or otherwise-in the selection of its brethren, because the right to
worship what and with whom one chooses is fundamental to the concept of free exercise of
religion."); Laycock, supra note 24.
277 See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (affirming polygamy convic-
tion despite Mormon defendant's religious convictions); Jehovah's Wimesses v. King
County Hosp., 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam) (summarily holding that parent could
not, on religious grounds, withhold blood transfusion that was necessary to save child's
life); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (permitting government to deny veterans'
benefits to people who cannot fulfill the active duty requirement because of their religious
beliefs); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(holding that governmental interest assertedly advanced by ordinances which deal with
ritual slaughter of animals did not justify targeting of religious activity); Employment Div.
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that native Americans could be penalized for the
sacramental use of peyote in their religion).
278 For a discussion of the limits of tolerance in this context, see Mniow, supra note 23,
at 77; Stolzenberg & Myers, supra note 131; Stolzenberg, supra note 23.
279 Weisbrod, supra note 23, at 835.
280 See, e.g., Gedicks, supra note 198.
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outnumber those who are at risk from discrimination. 28' To compli-
cate matters further, many of those subject to discrimination also have
a vested interest in religion.
However, there are more legitimate reasons to fear government
intrusion. Conflicts between religious institutions and government
pose dangers. We fear both the government's power and its impo-
tence. On the one hand, we fear that a relatively powerful govern-
ment may threaten prized personal religious liberties that go to the
core of how we define ourselves. The religious persecution of the
Mormons, 28 2 Native Americans, 283 Jehovah's Witnesses,28 4 and
Santeria highlights the threat posed by the government's power.28 5
On the other hand, we fear that a weak government will not be
able to enforce its decisions. Unenforceable rules undermine both
the legitimacy and the authority of government. Ultimately, law is a
blunt instrument for change, and the overuse of government power
may engender backlash and impotence. 28 6
Finally, we fear the factionalization and violence reflected in a
long history of religious disputes ranging from the English Civil War
to the horrors in Northern Ireland, the Mideast, and Bosnia. Govern-
ment actions trigger our fears either by limiting the free exercise of
our own faith, or establishing another faith. These concerns are bun-
dled into the First Amendment that makes us leery to impose secular
rules on religious entities unless necessary. The problem then be-
comes how to define when it is necessary for the state to act.
D. The Government's Interest
As suggested earlier, government rules that authorize religious in-
stitutions to discriminate deny equal protection, religious freedom,
and free speech to individuals. The state needs a compelling interest
281 Id. at 100-01 n.3 (collecting statistics to show the large percentage of religious
Americans).
282 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (affirming a polygamy conviction
over Mormon defendant's religious convictions).
283 Employment Div., 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
284 See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981);
Gavin v. People's Natural Gas Co., 613 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1980).
285 Church of the Lukumi Babulu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
286 James Madison raised this argument in opposing the establishment of religious
teachers in Virginia:
Because attempts to enforce by legal sanctions, acts obnoxious to so great a
proportion of Citizens, tend to enervate the laws in general, and to slacken
the bands of Society. If it be difficult to execute any law which is not gener-
ally deemed to be necessary or salutary, what must be the case, where it is
deemed invalid and dangerous? And what may be the effect of so striking
an example of impotency in the Government, on its general authority?
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), reprinted in
AnAs & EmmzmucH, supra note 226, para 18, at 109.
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to warrant these intrusions. The government's possible state interests
include: (1) shielding religious institutions from non-religious illegal
behavior, (2) accommodating sincere religious faith, (3) avoiding en-
tanglement with religious institutions, and (4) combatting
discrimination.
1. Shielding Religious Institutions From Non-Religious Illegal
Behavior
For many cases, the state can identify no compelling interest in
denying civil rights to religious employees. The government typically
claims that it has a compelling state interest in protecting the employ-
ing institution's free exercise of religion. Even assuming for the sake
of argument that institutions rather than individuals have free exer-
cise rights, 28 7 no such free exercise claims arise if the religion does not
embrace discriminatory principles as part of its faith. Consider, for
example, the case of Reverend Young, the African-American woman
pastor who was fired by the United Methodist Conference.288 The
Methodist Church articulated strong anti-slavery sentiments as early as
1784289 and race or sex discrimination is not part of the United Meth-
odist creed.2 90 When religious views are not involved, the state has no
interest in promoting discrimination.
In most cases there are no allegations that the religious insti-
tutions embraced a form of discrimination as a matter of
faith. For example, one assistant pastor claimed that her super-
vising pastor was sexually harassing her.2 9 1 Other ministers com-
plained that they were fired because of their disabilities, 292 age, 293
287 For a discussion of when institutional rights of free exercise should be permitted,
see supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
289 CREEL, supra note 4, at 140-41. As always, the history reflects a continuous tension.
Initially, the organization was vehemently abolitionist and required members to free their
slaves or be excommunicated. These rules were later changed, prompting a group of min-
isters to sign an agreement in 1795 condemning slave holders. A year later the church
adopted a position that continued to characterize slavery as evil, but permitted slave hold-
ers to be members of the church. Id. at 140-48.
290 BOOK OF DISCIPLINE OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, supra note 31, at 98-95.
291 Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
292 Graves v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 624 F. Supp. 429 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (mental
illness); Hafher v. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 616 F. Supp. 735 (N.D. Ind. 1985)
(chronic illness).
293 DeMarco v. Holy Cross High School, 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993); Geary v. Visitation
of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 1993); Scharon v. St. Luke's
Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp. 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991); Minker v. Baltimore Annual
Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Tagatz v. Mar-
quette Univ., 861 F.2d 1040 (7th Cir. 1988); Stouch v. Brothers of the Order of Hermits of
St. Augustine, 836 F. Supp. 1134 (E.D. Penn. 1993); Weissman v. Congregation Shaare
Emeth, 839 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Mo. 1993); Maness v. Friendly Ave. Baptist Church Weekday
Learning Ctr., Inc., 1993 WL 155375 (M.D.N.C.); Piasecki v. Daughters of Jacob Nursing
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race,294 sex 295 , and others claimed violations of the equal pay act.2 9 6 If
these discriminatory acts genuinely conflict with religious doctrine,
the religious entity could simply respond to the complaint with a clear
statement, such as: "Our religion believes in age discrimination." In
fact, few if any of these religions profess such beliefs.
The First Amendment does not grant religions the right to dis-
criminate. It merely guarantees the right to freely exercise religious
beliefs. In the absence of discriminatory church doctrines, religious
institutions have no greater right to discriminate than any other em-
ployer. Congress confirmed this principle when it refused to create
an exception in Title VII for race, sex, or alienage discrimination by
religious employers. 297 Employers should not be permitted to use the
First Amendment as a shield for non-religious illegal behavior.
Although critics might argue that the mere inquiry into hiring or
firing decisions intrudes on religion, a court can decide such issues
without ruling on the "correct" faith. Most employment discrimina-
tion cases are firing cases rather than hiring cases. 298 Once clergy
have been hired, the religion already has determined that the individ-
uals initially meet their religious qualifications. Consequently, courts
are less likely to intrude in religious matters in discriminatory dis-
charge or benefits cases. For example, ordering an employer not to
fire a minister because he is old is different from ordering an em-
ployer to hire a woman priest or rabbi. Discharge cases thus pose less
threat to religion than hiring cases. Requiring the religious entity sim-
ply to explain the reason for the discharge need not intrude on reli-
gious beliefs. Therefore, the state can serve its interests in preventing
discrimination without treading on religious beliefs.
Home, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1136 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Lukaszewski v. Nazareth Hosp., 764 F.
Supp. 57 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Cochran v. St. Louis Preparatory Seminary, 717 F. Supp. 1413
(E.D. Mo. 1989); Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College, 495 F. Supp. 724 (D. Md. 1980), affd,
814 F.2d 986 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 913 (1987).
294 Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 320 (1994); Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490 (5th
Cir. 1974).
295 Young, 21 F.3d 184 (dismissing a suit by a pastor alleging sex and race discrimina-
tion); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991).
296 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, United States
409 U.S. 896 (1972); United States Dep't of Labor v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 707 F.
Supp. 1450 (W.D. Va. 1989), affd, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 846
(1990); Russell v. Belmont College, 554 F. Supp. 667 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
297 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1.
298 Among discrimination cases, firing suits are six times more common than hiring
suits. Douglas Laycock, Due Process of Law in Trilateral Disputes, 78 IowA L. REv. 1011, 1022-
23 n. 63 (1993). For further statistics on discrimination suits, see Samuel Issacharoff, When
Substance Mandates Procedure: Martin v. Wilks and the Rights of the Vested Incumbents in Civil
Rights Consent Decrees, 77 CoRNL L. Rxv. 189, 250 n. 297 (1992); John J. Donaghue M &
Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L.
REv. 983, 1015-16 (1991). I am grateful to Douglas Laycock for mentioning these sources.
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Of course, the religious entity may claim that the discharged em-
ployee performed the religious duties badly. Even then, courts need
not determine the "correct" religious view. They are not required to
determine the proper standard for clergy behavior, any more than
they need to determine the job description for any other position.
The standard is whether the defendant's reasons for firing the em-
ployee amount to more than a mere pretext for discrimination.299
The defendant need only show that it had a nondiscriminatory reason
to fire the employee.300 So long as the employer's asserted justifica-
tion is more than a pretext, the employer prevails. It is the employer,
in this case the religious institution, that determines the relevant stan-
dards for the job. This limited inquiry is not a threat to religious lib-
erty; the court cannot evaluate or criticize the employer's proffered
standards so long as they are not discriminatory.3 01 As one court ex-
plained in holding a congregation answerable for age discrimination:
After an employer gives a reason other than the employee's age for
his or her dismissal, the employee can then attempt to show that the
stated reason is mere pretext. This limited review is much less
threatening to the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment than
the pervasive reach of the NLRB which concerned the Supreme
Court in Catholic Bishop.302
Therefore, in cases in which the alleged discrimination is not claimed
to be an article of faith, courts can decide employment discrimination
suits against religious employers without opening the door to govern-
mental definitions of faith.3 03 The state has no interest at all in per-
mitting non-religiously based discrimination.
2. Accommodating Sincere Religious Faith
Arguably, however, the state has an interest in protecting the reli-
gious liberty of both the employer and the employee when the dis-
crimination is religiously based. Accordingly, the government faces a
dilemma when confronted by institutions that embed discrimination
in their faith because conflicting constitutional values are at stake.
For example, some fundamentalist Christians believe that African-
Americans bear the mark of Cain.304 Similarly, the Pope, if not the
299 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
300 Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981).
301 Weissman v. Congregation Shaare Emeth, 38 F.8d 1038 (8th Cir. 1994).
302 Id. at 1043.
303 Several circuits have now ruled that religious employers should therefore be sub-
ject to age discrimination claims for their non-ministerial employees. See, e.g., id.; Geary v.
Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 1993); DeMarco v.
Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993).
304 See, e.g., BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (involving religious
university that argued that its racially discriminatory policies were mandated by religious
doctrine holding that African-Americans bear the mark of Cain).
1108 [Vol. 81:1049
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS
majority of American Catholics, maintains that women cannot be or-
dained because Christ did not choose any female appsles.30 5 Ortho-
dox Jews also believe that religious doctrine precludes women rabbis.
In these instances, the First Amendment claims have more credibility.
Nevertheless, this dilemma does not mean that the First Amend-
ment interests of religious entities should outweigh the free exercise
rights of the individuals, or their free speech rights, or their right to
be treated equally under the law. A private, secular employer could
not defend against a sex or race discrimination claim by citing a reli-
gious belief in the inferiority of the claimant. It is not clear why
groups of such religious people should have any greater rights.
Discrimination backed by religious fervor and governmental ap-
proval gravely threaten equal protection for excluded groups. Those
are precisely the kinds of combinations of religious and political
power that endangered colonial women and slave preachers. James
Madison might argue they are the same sorts of combinations that the
First Amendment separation of church and state was meant to pre-
vent.306 Such combined religious and political power in more overt
forms continues to bother the current Supreme Court.30 7
Religious employers might respond that such discrimination is
necessary to accommodate religion.308 Otherwise, the government
can define a faith by dictating the qualifications of its clergy. If to be
Catholic means to believe that women cannot be priests, then forcing
Catholics to accept women priests alters the faith itself. If Catholics
cannot discriminate against women priests, can they discriminate
against Jewish priests? It seems nonsensical to require a religion to
hire a leader of a different faith. However, employment discrimina-
tion laws need not be construed to require a Muslim rabbi or aJewish
priest. Hence, some accommodation of religion is acceptable. The
difficulty arises when religions define the faith in ways that exclude
disfavored groups like African-Americans, women, the disabled, or the
aged from religious leadership.
305 Alan Cowell, Pope Rules Out Debate on Making Women Priests, N.Y. TiMEs, May 31,
1994, at A8.
306 In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that
for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of inter-
ests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in
both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects ....
THE FEDERAuST No. 51, at 324 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). For a fuller
discussion of the separation of church and state and religions as factions, see infra note 385
and accompanying text.
307 Cf Board of Educ. of EryasJoel Village Sch. Dist v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2487
(1994) (holding that a school district created for a religious sect violated the Establishment
Clause because it "united civic and religious authority").
308 For a fuller discussion of the issue of accommodation, see infra note 379 and accom-
panying text.
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Some religious employers reply that government must accommo-
date their religion. There are two kinds of religious accommodations:
(1) mandatory accommodations required by the Free Exercise Clause,
and (2) permissive accommodations that are acceptable so long as
they do not establish religion. The scope of religious accommodation
has been hotly debated in the scholarly literature. 0 9 The Free Exer-
cise Clause may mandate certain accommodations, while the Estab-
lishment Clause may limit the extent of permissible accommodations.
The proper establishment clause standards are in a state of flux.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court held that a statute violates
the Establishment Clause unless it has a "secular purpose," it neither
"advances nor inhibits religion," and it does "not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion.' '310 Subsequent cases have
criticized the Lemon test, and the Court seems to have set up an alter-
native rule of "neutrality toward religion" in Board of Education of Kiryas
Joel Village School District v. Grumet.31
However, the Court has not expressly overruled Lemon, so it may
continue to have some constitutional viability. The exemption for
religious groups fails the Lemon test. An exemption created expressly
for religious organizations clearly does not have a secular purpose.
Similarly, it creates religious effects by promoting discriminatory reli-
gious beliefs and encouraging individuals like Mary Murphy to change
faiths. Finally, it may entangle the government in religion if the state
decides whether an employee is engaged in religious activities.
Unfortunately, the exception for religions that discriminate is
more likely to pass the neutrality test of KiyasJoel In KiyasJoel the
court went out of its way to encourage accommodation of religion,
and suggests that the primary problem with the scheme in KiryasJoel
was that it singled out a single sect for beneficial treatment. If it had
been a broader exception for religion in general, it might easily have
been affirmed as a "neutral" accommodation of religion.
In the case of employment discrimination, Congress has chosen
not to accommodate religious employers that discriminate on the ba-
sis of race, sex, or national origin. Courts, not Congress, created this
exception. These courts view the churches' exemption as not merely
a permissible accommodation of religion, but as a constitutionally
compelled exception to the civil rights statutes. However, the
Supreme Court rarely mandates free exercise exceptions to generally
309 See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 743
(1992); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the
Critics, 60 GEo. WASH. L. Ray. 685 (1992).
310 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Taz Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970)), affd, 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
311 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
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applicable laws.3 1 2 Indeed, William Marshall argues that no free exer-
cise exemptions should be constitutionally required.313 Similarly, Jus-
tice Scalia argues that we can trust Congress to create sufficient
religious accommodations without compelling exceptions for free ex-
ercise.314 Permitting Congress to determine the scope of religious
accommodations has two serious problems, however. First, it fails to
protect minority religious rights.3 15 A majoritarian Congress is pre-
cisely the wrong body to determine what rights unpopular religions
may have. Second, relying on Congress to decide the scope of reli-
gious accommodation fails to recognize the tension between the Free
Exercise and the Establishment Clauses. Establishment issues arise
when the government creates a benefit for religion, and free exercise
issues arise when government burdens religion.3 16 The problem is
that relieving religion of a normal burden creates a benefit. If creat-
ing exceptions runs the risk of establishing religion, then it is irrele-
vant whether courts or legislatures act: either way it may violate the
First Amendment.
Discriminatory religious employers might respond that the legis-
lature may choose to be more accommodating than the Free Exercise
Clause requires, so long as Congress does not go so far as to establish
religion. In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofjesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,317 the church had fired a custodian who
312 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (rejecting Native Ameri-
can's claim for exemption from unemployment rule that prohibits payment because of
sacramental use of peyote); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (rejecting Ortho-
doxJew's claim to wear yarmulke while on military duty); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v.
Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (rejecting religious organization's claim for ex-
emption from minimum wage and other labor laws); BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574 (1983) (rejecting university's claim that religious doctrine required free exercise
exemption from anti-discrimination provisions of the tax code); United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252 (1982) (rejecting Amish employer's claim for exemption from social security
taxes);JoHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSnTurIoNAL LAw § 17.6, at 1206 (4th
ed. 1991).
313 Marshall, infra note 372.
314 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). For a discussion of the
relationship between the courts and Congress on this issue, see Rex E. Lee, The Relgious
Freedom Restoration Act: Legislative Choice andJudicial Review, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 73 (arguing
that it is appropriate for Congress to legislate the proper standard for free exercise); Ron-
ald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductoy Analysis of the Congressional
Response toJudicial Interpretation, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 923 (1993) (discussing the rela-
tionship between the Supreme Court and Congress).
315 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Ac4 62
FORDHAM L. Ray. 883, 900 (1994) (arguing that the Congress would choose which minority
religions to tolerate). But seeJames E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. Ra,. 1407 (1992) (arguing that courts are reluctant to
mandate free exercise exceptions to generally applicable laws, and that religions fare bet-
ter by relying on legislative exceptions).
316 NoWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 312, § 17.6, at 1206.
317 483 U.S. 327, 343 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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worked at a gymnasium because he was not a Mormon.318 The Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Title VII exception that permits
churches to discriminate on the basis of religion.3 19 The burden in
Amos fell on the fired janitor and other lapsed Mormons. The govern-
ment was not assuming a burden in order to benefit religion gener-
ally. Rather it was permitting a religion to place an otherwise unlawful
burden on a third party. The Court failed to focus on how that deci-
sion would affect individuals meant to be protected by Title VII. In a
state like Utah, where the church controls many of the available jobs,
permitting such discrimination may seriously limit the job prospects
of non-Mormons. The Court never even considered whether the ex-
ception violated the Equal Protection Clause. As a result, the Court
loaned state power to encourage individuals to join the Mormon
Church.
Although Amos is a troubling case, it does not raise the specter of
dual discrimination. The custodian only complained of religious dis-
crimination. In contrast, claimants like Reverend Young complain of
sex and race discrimination,3 20 while others allege age321 or disability
bias.322 Accommodating a religious employer's preference for mem-
bers of its faith is less troubling than permitting it to discriminate
against its members on the basis of race, sex, age, or disability.
Some who support opening the clergy to disfavored groups might
still be reluctant to have that participation foisted on the church by
the government.323 Thus, critics might argue that those excluded
from religious offices should simply wait patiently for their religions to
change from within.324 The theory is that given time and social pres-
sure, faiths will gradually comply with the social norms. It might be a
long wait. It took over two hundred years for African-Americans to be
emancipated from slavery,325 and nearly another hundred years to
outlaw segregation.32 6 Similarly, women did not get the vote until
1920.327 Telling those excluded to wait longer than their children's
lifetimes excludes generations from a spiritual life.
318 Id. at 330.
319 Id. at 339-40.
320 See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
321 See cases cited in supra note 293.
322 See cases cited in supra note 292.
323 Coa raa, supra note 208, at 80 ("Had the ordination of women as priests or bishops
come in response to the state command, I would have been unhappily but firmly against
it.").
324 Douglas Laycock kindly proffered this advice to me informally at the Law & Society
Conference (June 16, 1994).
325 The Emancipation Proclamation, Sept. 22, 1862, 12 Stat. 1268, 1268-69.
326 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
327 U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIX.
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When religious organizations discriminate, the government faces
a dilemma. If the government protects minorities, women, the aged,
or the disabled, it may intrude on the free exercise of religion by
members of the established community of faith. If, however, govern-
ment carves out exceptions to civil rights laws for religious employers,
it lends its power to sanction discrimination that prevents disfavored
groups from exercising their religions and restricts their political and
social access. Both accommodation and enforcement place important
constitutional values in danger.
The dilemma can be described several different ways. In the First
Amendment literature, it often appears as an inherent tension that
arises between the religion clauses of the First Amendment.328 Any
attempt the government makes to assure free exercise of religion by
one party may amount to the establishment of another party's reli-
gion.3 29 The problem also could be viewed as a clash of free exercise
rights of the employer and the employee. Still others would describe
the conflict as the paradox of tolerance.330 Anti-discrimination princi-
ples teach tolerance which, in turn, excludes the viewpoint of intoler-
ant groups. The dilemma also exists in the establishment clause
that pits separationist views against accommodation of religion.33'
Others argue that the dilemma is inherent in any law that deals with
discrimination.33 2 Martha Minow calls it the "dilemma of differ-
328 See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, the Politics of Religion and the Symbols
of Governmen, 27 HAuv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rm. 503, 530 (1992); William P. Marshall & Douglas C.
Blomgren, Regulating Religious Organizations Under the Establishment Clause 47 OHIO ST. Lj.
293 (1986); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding ofFree Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1409 (1990).
329 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 59, § 14-6, at 1186 (arguing that accommodation of one
religion is often seen as preferential treatment by author); Gey, supra note 234 (arguing
that accommodation is difficult under the religion clauses); Brownstein, supra note 85.
330 For example, Carl Weisbrod argues:
[I]f we, as the outsiders, engage in (official) empathetic and compassionate
behavior towards the individual excluded, we damage the theory of multi-
ple communities to which at least one version of our pluralism is commit-
ted. If we vindicate pluralism in theory, engaging in empathetic behavior
towards the group, we fail at the same time to assist a fellow member of our
own community, an Amish-American perhaps, who asks for our assistance.
The dilemma is a constant. Its resolution is to be found in specific cases,
rather than in a single principle or rule.
Weisbrod, supra note 23, at 835-36. See, also, MINOW, supra note 23, at 77; Stolzenberg,
supra note 23, at 650.
331 For an excellent discussion of this dilemma, see Valauri, supra note 133.
332 Martha Minow, for example, argues:
In essence, the framers of the [First] Amendment understood that domi-
nant groups might organize society in ways that would cramp the religious
practices of minorities, and the framers also understood that any govern-
mental action favoring a religion could so accentuate that trait as to disad-
vantage anyone who did not subscribe to that religion. The First
Amendment thus grasps the dilemma of difference but does not resolve it.
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ence."33 3 To oppose discrimination, the government defines the
group discriminated against, but the very process of defining the os-
tracized group further isolates it. The result of these dilemmas is a
double-bind; 34 the government cannot protect one constitutional
value without sacrificing another.
The solution to the dilemma must advance the most important
constitutional values, while minimizing the risk to competing values.
Religion is an important part of individuals' spiritual lives and the
political process. Accordingly, religion is an influential component of
our culture that reinforces either tolerance or intolerance. When reli-
gious employers discriminate, they create a culture of subordination.
If government prohibits such job bias, it may intrude on group free
exercise rights. If, however, it exempts religion from civil rights laws,
it intrudes on individual free exercise rights, impedes spiritual and
political participation and speech, and violates equal protection of the
laws. Competing constitutional values are at stake.
3. Avoiding Entanglement With Religion
In order to preserve religious pluralism and cultural autonomy,
the state tries to minimize its influence by refusing to take sides on
religious issues. Contrary to this neutral self-image, however, the state
does choose sides when confronted with religious disputes over dis-
crimination no matter what it does. If it refuses to resolve the dispute,
the state acts in favor of discrimination and favors institutional belief
over individual faith. If it hears the case, the court eventually must
resolve the dispute, with either side having a chance to win, depend-
ing on the facts and how the court applies independent legal
principles.
When the state refuses to arbitrate disputes,33 5 it views religions as
static institutions and reinforces a particular religious idea at the ex-
pense of another. In fact, religions are constantly subject to internal
debate and religious ideas within a faith are contingent and evolving
over time.336 In theory, state non-intervention preserves religious cul-
tures. However, as Martha Minow explains: "'[P]reserving distinctive
cultures' does not mean preserving them in amber but instead al-
MINOW, supra note 23, at 43; see also MargaretJane Radin, The Pragmatist and theFeininis 63
S. CAL. L. REv. 1699 (1990) (describing the dilemma as a "double bind.")
333 See Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REV. 10, 12-14 (1987).
334 See Radin, supra note 332.
335 See, e.g.,Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for
The United States and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Watson v. Jones, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872); Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist
Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 320 (1994).
336 See Laycock, supra note 24, at 1391 (acknowledging that religious institutions are
"dynamic" so that the religious views change over time).
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lowing them to grow and change in light of the struggles of their
members and the pressures from outside challenges."337 Elsewhere, I
have criticized static definitions as "stopping the music in musical
chairs. Those who have seats are privileged, but those left standing
are excluded."33 8 The most powerful members within the religion can
suppress competing views, particularly when the excluded members
are relatively powerless both in the faith and the polity. Consequently,
powerlessness is mutually reinforcing in both the religious group and
the polity.
All too often the state's refusal to decide simply permits the more
powerful party to win.339  As Frederick Schauer explains:
"[G]overnmental non-intervention does not leave a vacuum with no
power, no resources, and no advantages, but rather some existing dis-
tribution of power, resources, and advantages... ."40 Unfortunately,
that power disparity often has racist or sexist overtones because it re-
flects an unfair status quo. African-American ministers, for example,
needed the help of courts to gain control of their own churches in the
nineteenth century.3 41 Similarly, when modem courts refuse to en-
force anti-discrimination laws, the burden may fall on people like Rev-
erend Young, an African-American woman.3 42
4. Combatting Discrimination
It seems intrusive for the government to settle religious disputes.
Recall Molly, the Catholic girl questioning the all male priesthood.
How is Molly's case different from ajewish girl who says, "I agree with
everything, except for one minor point: I believe thatJesus is the Mes-
337 Martha Minow, Putting Up and Putting Down: Tolerance Reconsidered, in COMPARATVE
CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM: EUROPE AND AMERICA 77, 92 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1990).
338 Rutherford, supra note 38, at 29.
339 See Gerstenblith, supra note 202, at 533. For similar arguments in other contexts
see Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Aheai Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,
9 LAW & Soc'y REv. 95 (1974); Rutherford, supra note 36, at 41.
340 Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Pinciple, 64 U. COLO. L.
REv. 935, 951 (1993).
341 As one nineteenth-century African-American Methodist minister explained:
The conference (as I have understood) have said repeatedly, that the col-
oured societies was nothing but an unprofitable trouble; and yet, when the
society of Bethel Church unanimously requested to go free, it was not
granted, until the supreme court of Pa said, it should be so. But again, it
will be asked, who could stop them, if they were determined to go. None-
Provided they had left their church property behind; to purchase which,
perhaps many of them had deprived their children of bread.
Sermon delivered in the African Bethel Church in Baltimore (January 21, 1816), in 1 A
DOcUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 68 (Herbert Aptheker
ed., 1990).
342 Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 320 (1994).
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siah"?34 Arguably, deciding religious job disputes is akin to deciding
what constitutes heresy. How can employment decisions be distin-
guished from other disputes over religious doctrine?
Job bias disputes are different from other religious conflicts be-
cause the state has a compelling state interest of constitutional magni-
tude that is absent in most other religious disputes. The government
has a compelling state interest to eradicate discrimination.3 44 In con-
trast, the state has no interest at all in the outcome of other religious
disputes such as whether Jesus is the Messiah.
The state's interest in eliminating job bias is even stronger than
most interests it asserts as compelling, because it is supported by the
egalitarian language in the Fourteenth Amendment and federal stat-
utes. Consequently, it is not only a compelling state interest, but one
provided for in the Constitution itself. Because the Fourteenth
Amendment expressly grants Congress the power to enforce its provi-
sions,3 45 the Court frequently honors congressional efforts to elimi-
nate discrimination.346
The Supreme Court has affirmed the primary importance of
eliminating discrimination in Bob Jones University v. United States,347
holding that this compelling state interest justifies intruding on First
Amendment religious rights. In Bob Jones University the Court permit-
ted the Internal Revenue Service to deny a charitable deduction to a
religious university because it discriminated against African-American
students.3 48 The Court conceded that the discrimination was relig-
iously based, but found that the compelling state interest in eradicat-
ing discrimination outweighs the free exercise claims of the
university.349 Although the case left open the question of whether the
same principles should apply to churches, the state interests that the
Court articulated remain just as compelling regardless of the nature
of the biased institution. Religious employees' discrimination suits
likewise present strong claims of a compelling state interest because
343 I am grateful to my colleague, Mark Weber, for this analogy.
344 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547 (1990) overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995);
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267 (1986); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983); Crawford v. Los
Angeles Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 496 (1980)
(Powell, J., concurring); Fulilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980); Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
345 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
346 See, e.g., City of Richmond v.JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490-91 (1989); Fullilov
448 U.S. at 503.
347 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983).
348 Id. at 595-96.
349 Id. at 595.
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they are based on important constitutional values reflected in the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This distinction between state interests that reflect constitutional
values, and other less-important state interests, protects religious free-
dom. For many years, the government only could burden sincere reli-
gious belief when the state was using the least restrictive alternative in
furtherance of a compelling state interest.350 Although that standard
sounds like strict scrutiny, in practice most free exercise claims were
denied.35 ' Just enough plaintiffs prevailed to render the law unpre-
dictable. 52 As a result, it is unclear what state interests are sufficiently
compelling to justify intrusions on religious freedom: Douglas Lay-
cock calls the definition of a compelling state interest in this context
"inconsistent" and proposes his own definition. 353 Certainly, the com-
pelling state interest test applied to government intrusions on free ex-
ercise does not seem to be as strict as the scrutiny applied to racial
discrimination. 54
Narrowly defining compelling state interests as those that protect
constitutional values such as equal protection strengthens religious
liberty in two ways. First, it provides a standard for defining a suffi-
cient state interest. Second, the standard is stricter than the neutrality
test sometimes applied. 55 Although defining the appropriate consti-
tutional values may prove difficult,3 56 at least it provides a principled
350 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
351 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, Free
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHi. L. REv. 1109, 1110 (1990);James E.
Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REv.
1407 (1992).
352 See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205; Presbyterian Church v. Mary Eliza-
beth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Sherbert 374 U.S. at
398; Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953);
Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78
(1944).
353 Laycock, supra note 315, at 901-02. He suggests that a state interest is only compel-
ling if it is designed to protect individuals who have notjoined the religion from tangible
harm. Id. at 886.
354 See McConnell, supra note 351, at 1127-28 (suggesting that the Court applied
heightened scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny in its free exercise jurisprudence).
355 See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
356 For example, does the state have a constitutionally based interest in protecting chil-
dren from religious practices that endanger their health? See, e.g., Walker v. Superior
Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988) (holding that the state could prosecute Christian Scientist
parents who failed to seek medical treatment for their terminally ill child); In re Elisha
McCauley, 565 N.E.2d 411 (Mass. 1991) (allowing medical personnel to administer a deci-
sion to force a child to receive a blood transfusion over the objections of his Jehovah's
Witness parents). But see Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1992) (reversing a third-
degree murder conviction of Christian Scientist parents who withheld medical treatment
from a child who died of diabetes); State v. McKown, 461 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. App. 1990),
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basis for the discussion. Because few state interests are even arguably
constitutionally based, fewer state interests will justify intrusions on
religion. For instance, prohibiting soldiers from wearing yarmulkes
would not serve a compelling state interest because the prohibition is
unrelated to constitutional values.3 57 Therefore, requiring the state to
justify intrusions on religious liberty with a constitutional interest
strengthens religious freedom.
Although the language of the First Amendment seems absolute,
the Court never has held that religious liberties are unlimited.358 In
deciding how far government can go, the Court has vacillated be-
tween notions of neutrality and deference. Both theories are articu-
lated in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich.359 The majority
held that courts must defer to the church hierarchy. Therefore, the
lower court should not have ruled on the dispute over who controls
church property. In contrast, Justice Rehnquist in dissent, argued
that courts should resolve such disputes by applying neutral principles
of law.360 Both sides saw the issue in tens of entanglement. If the
court decides the dispute, it may get entangled in ecclesiastical law,
risking establishment of the court's view of the faith. If, however, the
court defers to the hierarchy, it establishes that faction's religious
views. Even worse in Rehnquist's view, blind deference to religious
hierarchies amounts to a license for unlawful behavior: "If the civil
affd, 475 N.W.2d 63 (Minn. 1991) (dismissing manslaughter charges against Christian Sci-
entist parents who failed to seek medical help for a child who died from diabetes).
The most recent twist on this debate arises from the practice of ritual genital mutila-
tion of young girls. This practice is associated with certain religions and follows various
groups as they emigrate to the United States. For a discussion of the problem, see Kay
Boulware-Miller, Female Circumcision: Challenges to the Practice as a Human Rights Violation, 8
HARv. WoMEN's .J. 155 (1985); Katherine Brennan, The Influence of Cultural Relativism on
International Human Rights Law: Female Circumcision as a Case Study, 7 LAw & INEQ. 367
(1989); William E. Brigman, Circumcision as Child Abuse: The Legal and Constitutional Issues,
23 J. FAm. L 337 (1984); Linda Cipriani, Gender and Persecution: Protecting Women Under
International Refugee Law, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 511 (1993); Note, What's Culture Got To Do
With It? Excising the Harmful Tradition of Female Circumcision, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1944 (1993).
Arguably, the state interest in preventing such abuse is based on a constitutional value
placed on life. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973). That argument has two problems, how-
ever. First, not all religiously based practices that endanger children's health are life
threatening. Second, the Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause does not
grant living children the right to be protected from their parents. DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Social Sers., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). Although the state may have a compel-
ling state interest that it chooses not to exercise, the Court has never held that children
have a constitutional interest in good health that can be asserted against their parents.
357 But see Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (holding that the army had a
compelling state interest in preventing soldiers from wearing yarmulkes).
358 But see McConnell, supra note 351, at 1116 (acknowledging that while some implied
limits on the First Amendment exist, it is nevertheless absolute in its terms).
359 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
360 Id. at 728 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T] the court was merely recognizing and
applying general rules ....").
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courts are to be bound by any sheet of parchment bearing the ecclesi-
astical seal and purporting to be a decree of a church court, they can
easily be converted into handmaidens of arbitrary lawlessness."36' Ar-
guably, invidious job discrimination is precisely this kind of lawless-
ness shielded by deference to religious authorities.
More recent cases have emphasized government neutrality as the
crucial measure of church-state relations. Neutrality is at the core of
Employment Division v. Smith,362 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah,363 and Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School Dis-
trict v. Grumet.364 In each of these cases, the Court championed the
notion that government should act neutrally toward religion, creating
general rules not designed to benefit or burden particular faiths.
Neutrality can be a troublesome concept. In one sense no "neu-
tral" position exists. All laws necessarily either apply to or exempt reli-
gion. However, if neutral merely means that the rule has not been
designed primarily to disadvantage faith, then it must be: (1) gener-
ally applicable, and (2) not targeted at particular faiths. In this sense
laws can and should be neutral.
These notions of neutrality are not new. Courts have been apply-
ing neutral principles to resolve religious disputes for decades. The
Supreme Court has permitted courts to resolve church property dis-
putes by using neutral principles of general law,365 and, although the
lower courts are split on the issue, some courts have allowed both
clergy contract disputes and church property disputes to be resolved
by neutral contract or property law.3 66 Hence, there is strong prece-
dent for applying neutral civil rights statutes to religion.
Indeed, the Court moved so far toward neutrality and away from
deference in Smith, that it seemingly overruled the compelling state
interest test altogether. There, the Court ruled that Native American
free exercise rights could not protect believers from a "valid or neutral
law of general applicability" that prohibited the use of peyote even for
sacramental purposes.3 67 Few free exercise claims could survive this
test. In order to meet it, a claimant would have to demonstrate that
the government intended to target a given religion.3 68 Consequently,
361 Id. at 726 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
362 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
363 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
364 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
365 See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
366 See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
367 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
368 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
(finding that city ordinances targeted the religious exercise of Santeria church members
when the ordinances exempted virtually all other possible applications, leaving the
Santeria's ritual slaughter the only conduct actually subject to the ordinances).
1996] 1119
1120 CORNE LAWREVIEW [Vol. 81:1049
Smith swung the pendulum away from deference to religious author-
ity, back toward government neutrality to religion.
It is unclear whether Smith remains good law. It has been widely
criticized in the law review literature,86 9 questioned in a subsequent
Supreme Court case,3 70 and arguably overturned by statute.3 71 Never-
theless, Smith has its supporters,3 72 and seems to be approved in dicta
in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,373 and more
openly in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v.
Grmet.3 74
The critiques of Smith vary. Some commentators think Smith was
wrong because it targeted Native American religions unfairly.37 5 If
Smith is viewed as a targeting case, then the problem is not with the
underlying rule of neutrality, but with the result that failed to see reli-
gious discrimination. Other critics argue that Smith is too hostile to
religion because it reverts to a rational basis test for intrusions on free
exercise.3 76 The critics propose different tests in its stead. Some, ap-
parently influenced byJohn Stuart Mill, propose that free exercise ex-
emptions should be sustained unless the exemptions injure others.3 77
Other scholars suggest a return to the compelling state interest test.3 7 8
In response to Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act (RFRA), which reinstates the compelling state interest
test.3 7 9
369 See Ryan, supra note 851, at 1409 n.15 (citing the literature critical of the Smith
decision).
370 Lambs Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
371 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
372 Several academics have endorsed the principles enunciated in Smith. See, e.g., Wil-
liam P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L REv. 308
(1991); William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemp-
tion, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 357 (1989-90); Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman, Paradox
Redux, 1992 Sup. CT. REV. 123; Mark V. Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme
Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989 Sup. CT. Rxv. 373; Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to
Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'v 591 (1990). The
Supreme Court appears to continue to support Smith. Rex Lee believes that the 5-4 major-
ity for the Smith position has been converted into a 6-3 majority. Lee, supra note 314, at 89.
373 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
374 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
375 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 351, at 1134-36.
376 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Rv.
221.
377 John Stuart Mill first articulated the theory that the primary limit on liberty is harm
to others. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Rapaport ed., 1978). Various current schol-
ars have applied that theory to argue that free exercise claims prevail unless they cause
harm to others. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 315, at 88; McConnell, supra note 351, at
1128; Stephen Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free Exercise Clause
1981 UTAH L. Rxv. 309, 370-75; Stephen L. Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously,
1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 333-34.
378 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 315, at 897.
379 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). Several commentators have argued that RFRA is un-
constitutional. See, e.g., Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress, Sec-
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The protection provided by the RFRA is narrower than that pro-
vided by the First Amendment, however. The RFRA provides that
"Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of reli-
gion .... " 38 0 In contrast, the First Amendment prohibits laws "re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof .... ,,8 1 Therefore, the RFRA protects only individual rights
of free exercise, while the First Amendment might be construed to
create group religious rights. This interpretation of the relevant lan-
guage is consistent with the Court's construction of the word person in
other contexts. For example, in construing the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Court has held that the use of the word person confers indi-
vidual, not class or group rights.38 2 Similarly, the use of the word
person in the RFRA protects individuals, not institutions.
If the RFRA only protects individual rights of free exercise, it pro-
tects the free exercise claims of discharged clergy, but not the commu-
nal free exercise right of the religious institution. When courts
exclude clergy from the protections provided by Congress, they place
an undue burden on their free exercise right to pursue a religious
career.
Enforcing the civil rights statutes meets both the Smith test of neu-
trality and the compelling state interest test. Anti-discrimination laws
tion 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Ac, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1539 (1995) (arguing that
RFRA offends both federalism and the separation of powers and hence is unconstitu-
tional); Daniel 0. Conkle, The Rel'gious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional Signifi-
cance of an Unconstitutional Statute 56 MoNT. L. REV. 395 (1995); Christopher L. Eisgruber
& Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 437 (1994); Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox
Into the Henhouse Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 357
(1994); Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of Legisla-
tive Power, 73 TEx. L. Rev. 247 (1994). At least one Circuit Judge agrees. Hamilton v.
Schriro, 74 F.3d 545, 1558-70 (1996) (McMillian, J., dissenting). Smith holds that the gov-
ernment should remain neutral toward religion. If such a "neutral" application of gener-
ally applicable laws is constitutionally required, Congress cannot overcome that
requirement of the First Amendment simply by passing a contrary statute. However, it
seems more likely that the Court will treat RFRA as a valid accommodation of religion
authorized by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Most lower courts that have con-
sidered the issue have ruled the act constitutional. See Sasnett v. Department of Correc-
tions of Wisconsin, 891 F. Supp. 1305, 1315-21 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (upholding the
constitutionality of RFRA as an exercise of Congressional power under § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment), affd, 91 F.3d 1018 (1996); Belgard v. Hawaii, 883 F. Supp. 510, 512-
17 (D. Haw. 1995); Abordo v. Hawaii, 902 F. Supp. 1220, 1229-34 (D. Haw. 1995). See
Laycock, supra note 315, at 897 (predicting that the constitutionality of RFRA will be chal-
lenged and sustained). See alsoJeremy Meyer, Ratchet Plus? Possible Constitutional Founda-
tions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 48 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 343
(1995).
380 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994) (emphasis added).
381 U.S. CONST. amend. I. For a fuller discussion of this distinction, see Patty Gersten-
blith, Architect as Artist: Artists'Rights and Historic Preservation, 12 CARDozo ARTs & ENT. LJ.
431, 461 (1994).
382 City of Richmond v. JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
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not only serve compelling state interests, they are also neutral laws of
general applicability that were not targeted at particular religions.3 83
Therefore, the statutes survive both the deferential compelling state
interest test and the Smith neutral principles test. Enforcing civil
rights laws even meets a version of the substantial harm test proposed
by some critics of the Smith decision.3 84 Governmentally condoned
discrimination by religious employers harms those excluded in a mul-
titude of direct, serious, and tangible ways. The discrimination in-
fringes on free exercise rights, chills religious and political
participation and speech, and denies equal protection of the laws.3 85
383 Some might argue that a law that affects some religions more than others is neces-
sarily targeted. For example, Douglas Laycock argues that my thesis is suspect because it
targets Jews and Catholics. Douglas Laycock, Comments at the Panel on Religion and
Equality, Law & Society Annual Meeting (June, 1994). In fact, these groups are not specifi-
cally targeted. Neither group espouses race, age, or disability discrimination, and only
Orthodox Jews and a minority of American Catholics are opposed to female clergy. The
usual definition of targeting is state action designed to reach particular groups. Here, the
anti-discrimination laws were designed to protect disfavored groups in general, not to disfa-
vor any religion.
384 See Laycock, supra note 315, at 886; McConnell, supra note 351, at 1128. Laycock
would limit the class of individuals harmed to those outside the religion. However, those
most at risk may be members of the religion. Religious behavior is less likely to affect those
who are not members. For example, children need to be protected from religious prac-
tices that could harm them such as the refusal to provide medical care. It is precisely the
religious children who need this protection. Even adults could conceivably need such pro-
tection. Surely, a state law that prohibited human sacrifice would meet the test, even if the
sacrificial victim consented.
385 Nevertheless, courts have refused to apply anti-discrimination laws to cases involv-
ing ministerial employees. Although the courts seem to agree that these employees in-
clude clergy, some courts have extended this common law exception to teachers and other
employees. See, e.g., Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that Catholic
school may decide not to renew non-Catholic teacher's contract due to her remarriage
because Title VII did not apply to school's decision); Rayburn v. General Conference of
Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied; 478 U.S. 1020 (1986);
DeMarco v. Holy Cross High School, 797 F. Supp. 1142 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd 4 F.3d 166
(2d Cir. 1993); Cochran v. St. Louis Preparatory Seminary, 717 F. Supp. 1413 (E.D. Mo.
1989); Carter v. Baltimore Annual Conference, Civ. A.No.86-2543 SSH., 1987 WL 18470
(D.D.C. Oct. 5, 1987). Thus when a ministerial employee is fired because of race, sex, or
age, courts refuse to apply the express mandates of Congress that prohibit such
discrimination.
Some scholars who have considered this question argue that such exceptions are nec-
essary to protect religion from the overweening power of the government. Bagni, supra
note 24; Laycock, supra note 24; Gedicks, supra note 198.
Ira Lupu has thoughtfully critiqued these views. Lupu, supra note 24. He recognizes
the seriousness of discrimination claims, but also acknowledges the threat to religion if the
government can control access to the clergy. His solution is quite creative: Require that
the criteria for church membership and clergy be the same. If a religious institution has a
legitimate claim that religious doctrine requires the exclusion of a group, women or mi-
norities, for example, then it must exclude them totally, not just from the clergy but from
church membership and participation altogether. Hence, the churches will pay for their
discriminatory hiring practices with diminished membership and resources.
Theoretically, this solution gets around the problem of entangling the government in
church affairs. To exclude a group from the clergy, the religious institution would have to
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Such discrimination also contributes to the culture of subordination,
so it harms those who are not members of the church, but who are
members of the disfavored groups. The state interest in eradicating
discrimination is so compelling that it justifies intruding on some reli-
gious liberties.
III
THE PRIMACY OF EQUALITY AS A RESOLUTION OF
THE DILEMMA
A. The Constitutional Relationship Between Religious Freedom
and Equality
The whole analysis of free exercise, establishment, and accommo-
dation claims misses a larger principle of constitutional law that could
help resolve the apparent dilemma. The very meaning of the First
Amendment was changed by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which elevated equality to the primary constitutional value.
Although the original Constitution was an elitist document that rein-
announce in advance those categories the faith deemed unacceptable for membership or
ministerial duties. Because the church would define these classes themselves, no entangle-
ment would result.
Creative as it is, this theory has a number of problems. First, the theory risks lowering
the status of the groups discriminated against even further. In essence, Lupu would send
Molly the same message the church sent her that she can be excluded from the church for
her gender. Although religions might theoretically be punished for excluding women and
minorities, the women and minorities so excluded would also be punished. Nor is it an
answer to respond that those excluded could simply create their own religious institutions
that were more inclusive. For many, religion is not merely a voluntary organization. For
example, if Molly were excluded, she could not create a new Catholic church because
according to her beliefs, only a priest can perform the sacraments. Hence, Molly could not
create her own church. Instead of merely being not quite pure enough for the exalted
status of clergy, the excluded groups are relegated to a status below that of mere members.
They are so unworthy, that they cannot even worship the same God. That is a counter-
productive message to send when attacking discrimination.
Second, as Lupu acknowledges, religious institutions may evade the rule by creating
different classes of membership. For example, white males might be "full members" while
blacks or women were merely "associates" or members of the "auxiliary." Any attempt to
enforce a ban on such intermediate measures again causes government entanglement in
church affairs. Indeed, forcing churches to apply the same standards for membership and
clergy is itself intrusive on their beliefs. Many faiths have standards for leadership that
differ from those for membership. Proposing that all faiths must equate the two becomes
an establishment of non-hierarchial religion.
Third, those meant to be protected from discrimination would be prevented from
exercising their own religions. A rule requiring religions to use the same standards for
clergy and membership could result in intruding on both the free exercise of the powerful
religious group, and the free exercise of the individuals who are the objects of discrimina-
tion. Lupu is caught in the same dilemma as the courts: The dispute cannot be resolved
without intruding on the free exercise rights of one side or the other. Lupu is right to look
for ways to prevent religious institutions from discriminating, but he cannot do so without
acknowledging that there will be substantial costs to the religious institutions involved.
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forced hierarchy both politically and culturally,3 86 all that changed
during reconstruction. At least some of the Radical Republicans
meant to open pulpits to African-Americans.
The religion clauses were altered to fit this new egalitarian princi-
ple just as the other parts of the Constitution were changed. To the
extent that the religion clauses conflict with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment demands of equality, those provisions must yield. Often the two
are mutually reinforcing. For example, both the First and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit the government from singling out religious in-
dividuals for disparate treatment, one as a matter of free exercise of
religion, and the other as a matter of equal protection. Similarly,
both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses can be read to re-
quire the government to treat different faiths equally, neither intrud-
ing nor establishing any particular creed. These doctrines also can be
expressed in terms of equal protection.
Even when religions seek accommodations for religious practices,
no conflict need arise with the Equal Protection Clause, so long as the
accommodations do not undermine equality. When, however, reli-
gious employers demand exceptions from civil rights statutes in order
to subordinate African-Americans, women, the disabled, or the eld-
erly, the First Amendment does not provide them a shield.
B. Remedies to Dismantle Discrimination While Minimizing the
Impact on Religious Liberties
All employers, religious or otherwise, should be prohibited from
discriminating on the basis of race, sex, national origin, age, preg-
nancy, or disability. However, the remedies for discrimination should
minimize the impact on religious liberties. One way to limit the reme-
dies is to distinguish between religiously based discrimination and dis-
crimination not sanctioned by faith.
1. Standard Remedies for Non-religiously Based Discrimination
Religious groups should not be able to use the First Amendment
as a shield for non-religious illegal discrimination. The First Amend-
ment protects only religious belief. If religious doctrine or faith does
not require the discrimination, then religious entities should be sub-
ject to the full range of remedies traditionally available, including in-
junctive relief and damages. Moreover, religious employers should be
subject to all the pressure the government can legally exert to discour-
age the illegal conduct. Accordingly, the government may act in a
386 See generally N.DELSIv, supra note 50 (arguing that the affluent framers used elitist
structures, like the electoral college and the indirect election of senators, to create a gov-
ernment that favored the primacy of property rights).
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vertical context with whatever criminal, administrative, or legal sanc-
tions it has. Thus, vertical intervention is appropriate even when the
excluded employee has not formally complained. For example, the
Internal Revenue Service could deny charitable deductions or state
agencies could cancel contracts for services. Purposeful illegal dis-
crimination should not be tolerated.
Arguably, the process of determining whether discrimination is
religiously based could entangle the courts with religion. However,
courts could simply defer to the members of the faith on this issue.
The incentive to purposely mischaracterize the religious view would
be small because it would only affect the nature of the remedy avail-
able. Relatively few religions would be motivated to publicly exagger-
ate their discriminatory principles. Often religions would not claim
discrimination to be a tenet of faith. For example, relatively few faiths
seem to claim age or disability discrimination as articles of faith.
Hence, there would be little intrusion in asking the religion to define
for the court what the faith required.
2. More Limited Remedies When the Religion Claims the
Discrimination is Religiously Based
When the employer asserts that the discrimination is part of reli-
gious doctrine, more limits on the available remedies are appropriate.
It seems particularly dangerous in this context to let the government
decide which religious employers it wants to target. The courts have
held that entanglement problems do not prohibit government agen-
cies like the E.E.O.C. or the I.R.S. from investigating allegations of
discrimination on the basis of age, sex, or race when those discrimi-
nated against are not members of the clergy.38 7 Religion has far
more to fear from such government regulatory intrusion than they do
from isolated suits by discharged clergy. Accordingly, the state only
should intervene in horizontal disputes in which the employee com-
plains about the discrimination either to a court or government
agency.
Similarly, to avoid the problem of government control of church
organizations, the use of injunctive relief should be limited in hiring
suits. These suits are less common than firing suits, and the risk of
infringing on religious principles seems greater. Forcing a faith to
hire a particular clergy member engenders fear of governmental con-
trol of religion. Once the institution already has hired an individual,
the religion has exercised its own judgment, and injunctive remedies
387 See, e.g., E.E.O.C.v. Tree of Life Christian Sch., 751 F. Supp 700 (S.D. Ohio 1990);
E.E.O.C. v. Freemont Christian Sch., 609 F. Supp 344 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 781 F.2d 1362
(9th Cir. 1986); E.E.O.C. v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 482 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Cal.
1979), affd, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982).
1996] 1125
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
are less intrusive. Moreover, injunctions requiring a religious em-
ployer to hire a particular individual are likely to be counter-produc-
tive. For example, imprisoning a Catholic cardinal for refusing to hire
women priests only creates a martyr. It is unlikely to change
behavior. 88
In contrast, financial penalties may be both more effective and
create less backlash. Therefore, prospective employees who can
demonstrate that they have been discriminated against on illegal
grounds should be able to maintain a suit for damages. Given the
small salaries of many religious employees, however, some form of pu-
nitive damages may be required. A few courts have suggested that
financial awards in discrimination suits against religious entities are
less intrusive than injunctive relief, and permitted suits for
damages.38 9
In cases where the employee already has been hired, the institu-
tion has at least initially determined that the employee meets their
religious criteria. Therefore, if the employee can prove illegal dis-
crimination in discharge or benefits, injunctive relief is less problem-
atic. In any event, damages are an appropriate and less intrusive
remedy as well.
In summary, two limits apply to the remedies available when dis-
criminatory practices are embedded in religious belief. First, the gov-
ernment should not initiate vertical legal or administrative procedures
to eliminate the discrimination unless a particular employee com-
plains. Hence, many administrative regulatory actions would be pro-
hibited. Second, injunctions should not be available in discriminatory
hiring suits, although they could be used in discharge or benefits
cases. In contrast, all plaintiffs should be able to maintain suits for
damages for discriminatory practices. By limiting the scope of the
remedy in cases in which discrimination is embedded in religious doc-
trine, the rights of those excluded could be protected while minimiz-
ing the impact on religious freedoms.
CONCLUSION
The problems of discrimination persist because they are deeply
imbedded in our common culture. Law, alone, has been unable to
eradicate bias. The only hope is broad scale change in social and cul-
tural values. One part of that culture is a religious heritage that is
388 For a brief argument against passing unpopular and largely unenforceable laws, see
text accompanying supra note 286.
389 See, e.g., Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. App. 1991); Congregation
Kol Ami v. Chicago Comm'n on Human Relations, 649 N.E.2d 470, 473 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995).
1126 [Vol. 81:1049
1996] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 1127
pervasively discriminatory.390 Section 702 of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act allows religious groups to discriminate on religious
grounds, 9 1 and courts sometimes permit religious institutions to dis-
criminate on the basis of race, sex, age, or disability.3 92 Such Congres-
sional or judicial exceptions to civil rights laws violate the Free
Exercise Clause because they limit the rights of minorities, women,
the aged, and the disabled to practice their religious beliefs on the
same terms as the dominant groups. Church leaders have a greater
chance of having their religious views incorporated into religious doc-
trine because of this access to power. When minorities, women, the
aged and the disabled are excluded from religious hierarchies, their
views are significantly less likely to be acknowledged. Those excluded
from leadership positions are denied the right to participate in their
own religion.
Some might argue that they should then leave and form their
own church.393 Requiring them to leave the institution creates a kind
of "separate but equal" segregation long since condemned in other
contexts. It also impinges on their religious freedom and precludes
390 See generally DALY, supra note 15 (arguing that patriarchal religion has helped per-
petuate a caste system based on sex); Becker, supra note 36 (arguing that some segments of
society find traditional religions oppressive); Durham & Dushku, supra note 44, at 438-40
(arguing that some segments of society find religions oppressive).
391 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1988) see also Apiz. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1463(F)
(1984 & Supp. 1994); CAL. Gov. CODE § 12955.4 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 760.10(9) (West 1982 & Supp. 1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.090 (Baldwin
1995); LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1006A(2) (West 1984 & Supp. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 37.2403 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.02 (West 1988 & Supp.
1995); N.Y. EXEC LAw § 296(55) (MCKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995); OHIO Rn,. CODE
§ 4112.02 (Baldwin 1993); 25 OKLA. ST. ANN. § 1307 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); OR. Rv.
STAT. § 659.020(2) (1989 & Supp. 1995); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 95 (1992 & Supp.
1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-13-80(h)(5) (Law. Co-op 1986 & Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 4-21-405 (1991 & Supp. 1995); TEx. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.109 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995);
Wvo. STAT. § 27-9-102(b) (1993 & Supp. 1995) (state counterparts to § 2000e-I).
392 See, e.g., Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a tenured protes-
tant teacher could be fired from a Roman Catholic school because she remarried without
following Catholic canonical law); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hospitals,
929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that a female Episcopal priest could not sue her
employer, a religiously affiliated hospital, for age and sex discrimination); Murphy v.
Derwinski, 776 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Colo. 1991) (holding that a VA hospital could require
an endorsement from the Roman Catholic church before permitting a woman to be
screened for a job as a hospital chaplain), aff'd, 990 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1993). But see
Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980) (holding that a Catholic
high school could not lawfully fire a female teacher who was single and pregnant because it
did not fire male teachers who engaged in premarital sex).
393 To some extent this may already be happening. See Peter Steinfels, Women's Group
Recasts Religion in its Own Image, N.Y. TIMES, April 21, 1993, at D12 ("And some seemed to
be inventing an eclectic new faith .... Much at their meeting represented a kind of velvet
secession, a quiet withdrawal from institutional Christianity."). Similarly, blacks have had
their own churches since the 18th century. E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro Church: A Nation
Within a Nation, in REUGION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 292 (John M. Mulder &John F. Wilson
eds., 1978).
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them from having access to powerful institutions that shape moral and
social policy. Often it precludes them from participating fully in the
larger secular world as well because religion is one of the crucial ave-
nues of access to the marketplace of ideas. Therefore, such discrimi-
nation undermines other important constitutional rights such as free
speech and the free exercise of religion. The First Amendment
should not be permitted to be used as a shield to protect such subor-
dinating conduct.
Nevertheless, applying anti-discrimination laws to religions poses
free exercise problems for religious groups. Some fear that empower-
ing the government to enforce civil rights laws against religions would
completely dismantle religion. That view puts too little faith in reli-
gion, however. It assumes that discrimination is the central tenet and
that nothing would be left if religion were forced to treat minorities,
women, the aged, and the disabled as equals.394 Nevertheless, reli-
gions do risk intrusions on free exercise rights. Courts faced with
these decisions are caught in a dilemma. Any decision intrudes on a
free exercise right, either of the religious groups or those excluded.
The only solution to the dilemma is to look outside the religion
clauses for a principled way to decide. That principle may be found in
the primacy of equality. Equality is the most important constitutional
value for three reasons: (1) history reveals that equality is the unifying
force that defines us as a nation; (2) equality is necessary to provide
legitimacy for democratic government; and (3) the primacy of equal-
ity assures that other constitutional values will be protected.
The Fourteenth Amendment is more than an addition to a list of
rules. It is the center-piece of a new paradigm that restructures the
relationships between individuals, states, and the federal government.
This new paradigm focuses more on individual rights, diminishes
states' rights, and measures the constitutionality of all government ac-
tion in terms of participation and equality. All that preceded it must
be reinterpreted to comply with those principles. Frequently, no con-
flict arises between the Fourteenth Amendment and the First Amend-
ment religion clauses. When they do conflict, however, the paradigm
of substantive equality should prevail. Specifically, that means that
courts are constitutionally required to enforce civil rights laws against
all religious groups and institutions.
394 Many faiths, however, have expressly egalitarian notions embodied in their doc-
trines. See, e.g., Emmanuel Rackman, Judaism and Equality, in EQUALmY NoMos IX, supra
note 4, 154, 166-67 (describingJudaism as a religion committed to the general principle of
equality before the Law).
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